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The claims of a patent are its boundaries, defining the scope of
exclusion. This boundary function of claims is undermined by the
fact that claims can be changed throughout the life of the patent,
thereby moving the patent boundary. A boundary that can be
moved at-will is one that the public cannot rely upon.
This Article explores the problems of malleable patent boundaries.
If a claim can be amended to permit a patentee to capture some-
thing he did not foresee when filing the patent application, the
amendment confers an unexpected windfall that did not contribute
to incentives to invent before filing. If a claim is amended so that a
patentee can capture something he did foresee but mistakenly failed
to claim initially, the amendment allows the patentee to shift the
loss of his own mistake to third parties. Either way, the amendment
is inefficient.
This Article proposes that patent boundaries should be fixed upon
patent issuance, and postissuance claim amendment disallowed.
Because claims before issuance do not create public reliance, preis-
suance amendment should be retained. Nonetheless, the possibility
of inefficient windfalls requires that preissuance amendment not be
given retroactive priority in order to limit the ability to capture
later developments.
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INTRODUCTION
Ask any patent lawyer what the most important part of a patent is, and
the answer will invariably be "the claims."' Claims are supposed to act as a
patent's boundaries, defining the patentee's monopoly.2 As a boundary, the
claim should "inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of
the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safe-
ly used or manufactured without a license and which may not. 3
1. See John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administra-
tive Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 109 (2000) ("Claims are the most important part of
the modem patent document."); Paul M. Janicke, When Patents Are Broadened Midstream: A Com-
promise Solution to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 7, 16 (1997)
("[T]he entirety of patent law centers around [the claims]."); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Mean-
ing of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MiCH. L. REv. 101, 101 (2005) ("The claims of a patent are central
to virtually every aspect of patent law.").
2. Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("It is axio-
matic that the claims mark the outer boundaries of the patent right to exclude.").
3. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
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The normal story of patent law's boundary problems is that claim lan-
guage is too vague.4 My goal in this Article is to discuss another-much
more problematic-reason that claims fail to act as meaningful patent boun-
daries. Simply put, claims can be explicitly changed throughout the patent's
lifetime, thereby moving the patent boundary. A redrawn boundary is much
worse than a vague boundary. A fence that is vague and has gaps is not ideal
for telling people where not to trespass, but is better than no fence at all; a
fence that will be redrawn after the fact is entirely useless. The literature on
clarifying claim language thus misses much of the problem: having crystal
clear claim language will not provide a patent boundary if that clear lan-
guage can be changed by the patentee whenever he wants.
Imagine a real property system where your neighbor is permitted to
move his fence to encompass your new house. Moreover, he then sues you
for trespassing and evicts you from the house. A real property system with
such constantly moving fences would quickly break down, as people move
fences in self-serving ways, litigate evictions, and stop building houses.
In comparison, a patentee is permitted to change his claims throughout
the life of the patent, generally at-will with few substantive limits. The
amended claim then retroacts upon competitors, forcing them to stop manu-
facturing, akin to evicting them from their factories. Similar to the
prediction in real property, this lack of stable boundaries causes constant
attempts to amend claims in self-serving ways, has sparked an explosion in
patent litigation,' and acts as a deterrent to productive investment in manu-
6facturing, research, and innovation. A particularly successful example was
Jerome Lemelson, who perfected the technique of filing vague patent appli-
cations that were kept secret until a mature industry developed a similar
idea, and then extracted high tolls from that industry.' Lemelson extracted
billions of dollars from various industries.s Other historical examples ab-
ound.9
4. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation:
The 7ime is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 209-
10 (2001); Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 206 (2005); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Pat-
ent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 50-52 (2005) (arguing that there is no right answer
because claim language exists on multiple levels of abstraction).
5. See Joseph P. Cook, On Understanding the Increase in US. Patent Litigation, 9 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 48, 48-50, 49 fig. 1 (2007) (showing large increase in litigation and discussing possi-
ble reasons).
6. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 130-44 (2008) (showing that in most industries litigation
costs induced by the patent system exceed the research and development generated).
7. Patricia Montalvo, Comment, How Will the New Twenty- Year Patent Term Affect You? A
Look at the TRIPs Agreement and the Adoption of a Twenty-Year Patent Term, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 157 (1996).
8. See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development, 18 ALB. L.J. ScI. &
TECH. 381,416 (2008).
9. Cf ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 612-15 (4th ed. 2007) (the case of George Seldon).
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The fact that patent boundaries can be moved, at any time and within
broad substantive limits, is one of the oddest and most problematic features
of the patent system. Such ex post claiming is commonly defended on two
grounds: (1) flexibility in defining the patented invention is necessary to
allow patentees to benefit from later developments, unforeseen at the time of
initial claim drafting;'0 and (2) flexibility is necessary to permit the cure of
any inadvertent mistakes by the patentee when drawing up the patent
boundaries." Neither is a compelling defense.
First, permitting patentees to change claims in order to capture unfore-
seen developments is, by definition, to confer a windfall upon them after the
fact. The ability to capture such windfalls contributes very little to the pat-
entee's incentive when he is investing in research and development, since
the windfall is unforeseen at that time. Conferring unforeseen windfalls
upon patentees therefore creates monopoly cost without corresponding gains
in incentives to invent or disclose. This contradicts the basic purpose of the
patent system.
Second, the ability to amend claims allows patentees to cure any mis-
takes they make in drafting them. But this happens by shifting the cost of
the mistake to competitors, by making these competitors pay royalties based
on the amended claim. Patentees thus profiting from their own mistakes
have no incentive to avoid them, and indeed have a perverse incentive to
deliberately commit such mistakes. Because patentees are the least-cost
avoider of claim-drafting mistakes, this shifting of loss is inefficient.
I propose in this Article that issued patents should not be amended. This
fixes the boundary of a patent upon its issuance, permitting claims to create
a binding and meaningful boundary. Before the issuance of a patent, amend-
ing claims to fix mistakes is useful, since before issuance such mistakes are
harmless. To prevent inefficient windfalls, however, even preissuance
amendment should not be permitted to capture later developments. This can
be accomplished by denying amended claims retroactive priority against
third-party activities.
Part I describes the basic doctrine of patent claims and procedures for
changing them. Part II analyzes the functions of written claims and why
claim amendment undermines these functions. Part III proposes several re-
forms, namely to end postissuance claim amendment and to deny retroactive
10. Stephen T. Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications: How the
PTO's Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent System with Hundreds
of Years of History, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 556, 557 (2006) (arguing that later amend-
ments are necessary because many patentees "have no idea" which of their multiple inventions in an
application will be successful).
11. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832) (stating that the inventor should not
be penalized for "an inadvertent or innocent mistake"); Pavan K. Agarwal, Patenting In Line with
the Federal Circuit, 12 FED. Cut. B.J. 395, 423 (2003) ("[Clontinuation applications permit the
patentee to undo mistakes (at least considered as such in hindsight)... ).
12. See Gideon Parchomovsky et al., Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv.
738, 756-57 (2007) (defining windfalls as unforeseeable gains).
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priority to preissuance amendments. Part IV considers some objections and
alternatives to my proposals. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE PATENT CLAIM AS A BOUNDARY
A. The Basics of Patent Claims
The process of obtaining a patent begins with filing an application in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). This application con-
tains several things, but the two most important are the specification and the
original claims. The specification is a detailed disclosure of the invention.
For example, a specification describing a table will describe what it looks
like (is it square or round); what it is made of (wood or plastic); how to
make it (using nails or screws); and what it is used for (dining tables or
reading desks). By contrast, the original claims-an application usually has
several-are each a single sentence describing the invention in more general
terms. For example, a claim over a table might read, "An apparatus compris-
ing a flat surface and four legs."
Each claim is then scrutinized by a PTO examiner to see if the invention
claimed meets the patentability criteria of novelty, usefulness, and
nonobviousness; as well as whether the claim corresponds to something
disclosed by the specification. 4 If the patent examiner finds the claims
satisfy the statutory criteria, the patent is issued with the specification and
the approved claims.
Once issued, the claims are supposed to define the scope of infringe-
ment.' 6 With minor exceptions, 7 the rule of patent law is that anything that
is literally described by a claim, infringes; and that which is not literally
described by a claim does not infringe." Because patent claims define in-
fringement, they are generally regarded as the boundary of a patent,1' much
as the boundaries of real property define trespass and the right of exclusion.
Thus, it is commonly said in patent law that "the name of the game is the
claim."2°
13. Section 11I of Title 35 of the U.S. Code specifies the required contents of a patent appli-
cation. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
14. For a detailed discussion of these patentability criteria, see infra Section I.C.
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 151-154 (2006).
16. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
17. The primary exception is the doctrine of equivalents, which holds that an "insubstantial
difference" between a claimed element and a feature of the accused product may not defeat in-
fringement. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). This
element-by-element comparison requires the doctrine of equivalents to operate within the strictures
of the claim itself, retaining some boundary-defining role for claims even in this context.
18. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374.
19. See, e.g., In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 442 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
20. In re Hiniker Co., 150 E3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Extent of
Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYIGHT L. 497,499 (1990)).
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A simple example demonstrates how claims work. A claim over a table
might be written as: "An apparatus comprising a flat surface and four legs."
Written this way, a triangular table with three legs would not be covered,
while a four-legged table would. Moreover, it does not matter for infringe-
ment that an infringing product has additional features, as long as it had the
minimum feature set specified. For example, a table with a set of drawers
attached or wheels at the bottom still infringes, as long as it also had a flat
top and four legs.
The purpose of the written claim is that it (theoretically) provides a clear
and reasonably simple way to determine infringement. Each claim is sup-
posed to be a bright-line rule that makes determining the answer to whether
a product is covered by the patent reasonably easy and certain. Historically,
in the absence of claims, judges and juries were forced to determine the in-
ventive aspect of a patent by looking to the entire patent specification and
the whole body of prior art, a task that was extremely burdensome.2 And
without claims, the jury determined infringement using a vague rule such as
whether the two inventions are "similar," leading to uncertainty.22 By provid-
ing the requisite simplicity and certainty, patent claims are supposed to
"inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly
asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or
manufactured without a license and which may not."23
As described in a voluminous literature, patent claims often fail to pro-
vide the certainty desired in boundaries. A frequently cited statistic is that
the Federal Circuit (which has exclusive jurisdiction in patent appeals) re-
24verses in 30 to 40 percent of cases involving claim interpretation. The
literature often attributes the causes of claim vagueness to reasons ranging
from the inherent imperfections of language,25 to the fact that patents sit on
the cutting edge of new technology where a technical vocabulary is still de-. 26
veloping, to the lack of incentives within the patent system for patentees to
21. See Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) (describing the
statutory addition of a claims requirement as "relieving the courts from the duty of ascertaining the
exact invention of the patentee by inference and conjecture, derived from a laborious examination of
previous inventions").
22. See infra Section I.A. I.
23. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
24. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233, 239 (2005) (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate for
claim construction). Notably, however, the Federal Circuit displays remarkable internal agreement
on claim construction matters. Disagreement on claim construction between Federal Circuit judges
is recorded in less than 5% of cases where the issue is raised. Id. at 243-44 (finding the figure to be
approximately 3%); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1155 (2004) (finding
slightly less than 5%); cf Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
hIterpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1072 & t. 11 (2007) (finding 8.3%, but
showing that this rate corresponds with dissent rates on other issues before the Federal Circuit).
25. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW § 2F, at 2-233 to -234 (1992).
26. See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L.
SC. & TECH. 1, 33 (2007).
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write clear language.27 A myriad of proposals to reform claim construction
then follows.
28
Vague claim language is a common problem that I do not wish to mini-
mize. The difficulty of drafting clear claim language can be illustrated by
the simple example above. What is a "flat surface"? Does it have to be abso-
lutely flat or are minor variations allowed? Does a cushioned surface count,
so that a chair would infringe the patent (surely a counterintuitive result)?
Even for simple technology, the translation of the intellectual idea behind
the table into words is difficult. 29 The complications of more sophisticated
technology make the task even harder for many patents. Moreover, vague-
ness undermines the boundary function of claims, since a vague claim is
neither easy to apply nor provides certainty in the result.
But the traditional solution to the problem of crafting clear claim lan-
guage early has been to give the patentees a second chance to get it right.30
Indeed, patentees receive not only a second chance, but a third chance and a
fourth chance-unlimited chances throughout the life of the patent to redraft
their claims." Thus, if it emerges a year after the patent issues that it is un-
clear whether the claim covers chairs with four legs, the patentee can seek to
reissue his patent to make clear that, yes, he does claim chairs as part of his
patent on tables, since chairs stand up in the same way as a table.
The use of ex post claim amendment to clarify vagaries in claim lan-
guage is a cure that is worse than the disease. It is far better to stick with the
vague claim drafted early, than the redrafted claim that emerges ex post.
Because while the ex post claim will remove the linguistic ambiguity that
surfaces, it invariably does so in the most patentee-friendly manner possible,
since it is the patentee who drafts the new claim in hindsight. This frustrates
the public notice function of claims because, although the claim is supposed
to "inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the mo-
nopoly asserted,' 3 2 it does the public very little good to find out that chairs,
cars, and all manner of other things sitting on four points are covered by the
patent one year after the patent issues. This problem is especially acute
27. Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 188-89 (2007).
28. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005); Miller, supra note 4; Craig Allen Nard, A
Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000); cf Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Con-
struction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretative Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033,
1041-43 (2007) (arguing against the common proposal to give greater deference to district judges).
29. See Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer
and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2016 (2005) (giving an example with claims over a pencil).
30. In re Altenpohl, 500 F.2d 1151, 1156-57 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("[A] patentee should be al-
lowed to correct an error or ambiguity in a claim [through reissue]."); see William R. Hubbard,
Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation,
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 368-71 (2009) (arguing for greater use of ex
post clarification mechanisms).
31. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 63, 64 (2004).
32. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (emphasis added).
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when (as is likely) the impetus for patentee clarification is that a competitor
has already spent millions of dollars building a factory for making chairs in
the belief that they did not infringe. The problem is magnified in that the
patentee is permitted not only to clarify his claims, but to completely change
them. A claim that expressly covered only tables with "four legs" can prop-
erly be changed later to cover something with three legs.
The effect of amending a claim is partially retroactive. While an
amended claim cannot cover devices that were sold prior to the amendment,
it can have retroactive effect against long-term investments. For example, a
patentee changes his patent on four-legged tables to cover three-legged ta-
bles. This patentee cannot obtain royalties on the three-legged tables sold
before the amendment receives patent office approval. However, the com-
petitor who built a factory for manufacturing three-legged tables probably
intended the factory to last for twenty years or more. The patentee can force
his competitor to shut down the entire factory. This "hold-up" leverage al-
lows a claim amendment to have significant retroactive bite.
The fact that claims can be so easily changed, and with retroactive ef-
fect, calls into question their function as property boundaries. Property
rights generally have a degree of stability to facilitate investment by their
owners and others.33 A property whose boundaries are constantly shifting is
a bad vehicle for investment-both for the property owner and any potential
34trespassers. Imagine, for example, that the fence on your land was con-
stantly moving in random directions. This would make it very risky for you
to improve your land, such as by building a house on it, because tomorrow
the fence might move inwards and take away your ownership. On the other
hand, your neighbors cannot improve their land either, because your fence
might move outwards and strip them of their rights. To top it off, nobody
would want to buy your land precisely because its future value is so hard to
determine.35 Because patent claims are easily changed, they serve as poor
boundaries, undermining the patent system for everyone.
In this way, claim changing is a much worse problem for boundary defi-
nition than simply vague claims, creating a cure worse than the disease. A
vague claim is a fuzzy boundary, like a fence with gaps that leaves a few
square feet of land ownership unclear. An amendable claim is a useless
boundary, akin to a fence that is crystal clear today but which might be
moved tomorrow, effectively rendering ownership of the entire tract unclear.
33. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 591 (1988)
("Hard-edged rules define assets and their ownership in such a way that what is bought stays
bought... ").
34. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (7th ed. 2007).
35. Cf Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321,
337-39 (1985) (explaining that property covenants must be certain to be upheld in the future to
establish a foundation for exchange).
[Vol. 108:523
Fixing Patent Boundaries
B. Constantly Shifting Patent Boundaries
A process to amend claims can be implemented through a variety of
procedural devices, depending on the time at which amendment is sought.
This section provides a brief summary of these mechanisms.
1. Preissuance Amendment
Under the statute, the original claims should reflect what the patentee
"regards as his invention., 36 The patentee may, however, change his mind
about what his invention is. The patentee who initially wrote a claim for
four-legged tables may decide that he really invented all types of tables, re-
gardless of how many legs they have. During the period between the filing
of the patent application and its eventual issuance as a patent, the patentee
has broad freedom to amend claims, with no explanation necessary.37 This
period between filing and issuance, during which the PTO considers wheth-
er the application should be granted as a patent, averages about thirty-two
months."
There is no legal limit to the number of original claims and amendments
that can be filed.39 One important practical limitation on both, however, is
cost. The PTO charges fees for both filing claims and repeatedly amending
them (the first amendment is free). If one must file multiple claims, how-
ever, filing a large number of claims through serial amendment is cheaper
than filing them all as original claims. 40 The incentive to file more claims, of
course, comes from the fact that every claim allows the invention to be de-
scribed in a slightly different way. Thus having multiple claims allows the
erecting of overlapping fences to the invention. Preissuance amendments are
therefore a ubiquitous part of the current system.
2. Postissuance Amendment
Once a patent is issued, it is somewhat more procedurally complicated
to change the claims. The formal language of an issued claim can
be changed only with a reissuance or reexamination, both of which carry
conditions. All of the practical benefits of preissuance amendment can
be secured, however, with a continuation application, with none of the
36. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
37. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2008). If evidence is obtained that the patentee is being mani-
festly dishonest, and does not regard the new claim as being part of his invention, the new claim is
invalid. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This doc-
trine of "dishonest claiming" is virtually never invoked, since the standard of proof is extremely
high. Id. (noting that "Allen admits" the claim does not reflect its invention).
38. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 16 (2008) [hereinafter PTO ANNUAL REPORT] (average pendency of 32.2
months).
39. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 533 (2d ed.
2003).
40. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2008) (schedule of fees).
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downsides, such as intervening rights. A brief summary of these vehicles is
helpful.
A reissuance allows the holder of an issued patent to go back to the PTO
and modify the claims, if there is a mistake or defect in the patent.4 , "Mis-
take" and "defect" in this context are construed extremely generously. A
patentee that obtained a patent claiming "a table with four legs" may go
back and seek a patent on "a table with at least three legs"-there is no need
to show that he made a typographical error or that he unconsciously put the
word "four" into the claim.42 In fact, the patentee does not need to explain
what the mistake or defect is at all.4 The only thing that is not considered to
be a mistake is a prior intentional disavowal: that is, the PTO specifically
asked "did you invent a table with three legs," and the patentee previously
answered "no" (either expressly or by clear implication), and then later tries
to claim a table with three legs.44
A reexamination is similar to a reissuance in changing the claims, but is
initiated differently. A reexamination is typically initiated by someone other
than the patentee, because the third party discovers new prior art that raises
45a substantial question as to the validity of the patent. In the example of a
patent covering a table, someone may discover an old book describing a
table before the patentee invented it, thereby potentially showing the patent
is invalid. Once a reexamination is initiated, claim amendments may be
made in the same way as in reissuance proceedings and preissuance amend-
ment.46
Patentees do not like to use reexamination and reissuance to amend
claims, for two reasons. First, patentees are limited in their ability to broa-
den claims during these procedures, that is, changing the claims to cover
more things. Broadening on reissuance is permitted only if requested within
two years of the initial patent issuing,47 and the patentee may not broaden
48claims at all in reexamination proceedings. Second, reissuance and reex-
amination are subject to "intervening rights." As with other methods of
amendment, intervening rights exempt all the products (e.g., the individual
three-legged tables) made or sold prior to the completion of a reissuance or
41. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
42. See In re Hounsfield, 699 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding no prior "intent to claim"
requirement).
43. See Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting PTO rule
change to remove the explanation requirement).
44. See Mentor Corp. v. Coloplast, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating the "re-
capture" rule).
45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (2006). A patentee can also request reexamination of his own pat-
ent, but this is relatively rare. In 2008, there were 680 ex parte reexamination requests filed. Of
these, 593 were filed by third parties and 87 were filed by the patent owner. PTO ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 38, at 127.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006) ("[R]eexamination will be conducted according to the proce-
dures established for initial examination......
47. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 305.
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reexamination proceeding from damages and injunction. Unique to inter
vening rights, however, is that courts have discretion to protect competitors
who made long-term investments, such as a factory, thereby largely elimi-
nating the retroactive effect of amendment.50 This discretion takes shape in
judicial permission for competitors to continue using a factory or machine,
without having to pay a royalty.5 The possibility of such protection against
retroactive effect means that patentees have less to gain from reissuance and
reexamination.
A far more appealing avenue for a patentee is to seek the changes
through a continuation application." Continuation applications allow the
patentee to do everything that he can achieve with a reissue application, but
without the limit on claim broadening, and without intervening rights accru-
ing to competitors.
A continuation application is essentially the filing of a second, identical,
patent application at a later date. The first application is known as the "orig-
inal" application and the second as its "continuation." The continuation is
treated for almost all purposes as if it were filed on the date of the original
application. Thus, the patentee might file the original application on a table
on January 1, 2000, and he may file a continuation application on February
1, 2003. As long as the specifications of the two applications are identical
and a notation is made that the 2003 application is a continuation, it will be
treated as if it were filed on January 1, 2000.
This apparently simple device is incredibly useful to a patent applicant,
because there is no limit to the number of continuation applications that can
be filed,54 and there is no limit to the claim changing that can occur through
a string of continuations. Moreover, the filing of a continuation does not
prevent the original application from issuing. Thus, suppose that you file
the original application in 2000, and file the first continuation in 2001 with
49. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
51. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat'l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 294-95 (1940).
52. "Continuations" refer to both a family of procedural devices in the PTO and a specific
member of that family. A "continuation application" under 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78
refers to a later application that claims priority to the originally filed application. A "divisional"
application under 35 U.S.C. § 121 has the same effect but with claims directed to an ostensibly
separate invention. A "request for continued examination" under 35 U.S.C. § 132 continues prosecu-
tion of the same application, effectively as if a continuation is filed but without a separate
application. These are often collectively referred to as "continuations" because "their policy effects
are indistinguishable." Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 64 n.2.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006) ("An application for patent for an invention disclosed ... in an
application previously filed in the United States ... shall have the same effect, as to such invention,
as though filed on the date of the prior application... ").
54. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1367, vacated pending reh'g en banc, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1153
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
55. The continuation must be filed while another application is pending. Thus, the first con-
tinuation must be filed while the original application is pending; the second continuation must be
filed while the first continuation is pending; and so on. This creates a "string" of continuations that
persists through the life of the patent, which is twenty years from the filing of the original applica-
tion. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
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twenty new claims as amendments. You can then file a second continuation
in 2002 with another twenty claim amendments, and a third in 2003, and so
on ad infinitum. Because an applicant can keep filing new continuations and
new claims after old claims get rejected by the PTO, "it is impossible ... to
ever finally reject a patent application."56
The string of continuations leads to unlimited claim changing even after
the first patent (or multiple patents) has issued. Say that the original applica-
tion, filed in 2000, claims "a red wooden table with four legs," and a patent
is issued in 2001. This is quite a narrow claim and a competitor can easily
avoid infringing the original patent by changing the color to blue. Seeing
this, the patentee can use a continuation filed in 2002 to pursue a different
claim: "A table with three or more legs, of any color." The competitor who
has just finished his factory for building blue tables suddenly becomes an
infringer when the 2002 continuation issues as a patent. Ostensibly, the
2002 continuation will issue as a separate patent (and thus it does not liter-
ally "change" the original patent), but its practical effect is to supersede the
original patent, since it has a broader claim. This practical effect arises be-
cause anything infringing the narrow claim will necessarily infringe the
broader claim (all red tables are necessarily tables), and infringing one claim
is the same legally as infringing a dozen.
The fact that the later patent (issued from a continuation) effectively su-
persedes the original patent means that a continuation can do everything that
a reissuance or reexamination can do, and more. First, there is no limit on
broadening claims through a continuation-it can occur at any time and is
not limited to two years.57 Second, there are no intervening rights for a con-
58tinuation. The competitor who builds a factory to build blue tables must
shut down the entire factory. What this means in practice is that the competi-
tor will pay the patent owner a hefty royalty that reflects not the cost of any
accused products made by the factory, but the value of the factory itself.59 It
is therefore not surprising that continuations are the method of choice for
amending claims postissuance.6
C. Limits on Claims and the True Patent Boundary
The procedures of the PTO effectively permit an unlimited quantity of
amendments. This does not mean, of course, that patentees may amend to
claim anything under the sun. An amended claim must satisfy the same cri-
56. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 64.
57. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc) (contrasting reissuance and continuations by the two-year limitation).
58. See Tex. Instruments Inc. v. USITC, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (endorsing
exclusion of competitor product by a continuation patent); Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 109
(arguing for creation of intervening rights for continuations that broaden previous claims).
59. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tx. L.
REV. 1991, 1995-98 (2007).




teria of patentability as an original claim. What it does mean, however, is
that these criteria of patentability set the real boundaries of a patent right.
Any other limits of patent law (such as claim language) are illusory, since a
patentee can always circumvent them later through amendment. This turns
an important patent-law principle-that claim language defines the pat-
entee's right to exclude-on its head.
For most patents, the requirements of patentability boil down to having
the subject matter of the claim be an advance over what was previously in
the public domain (known in patent parlance as the "prior art"), and also be
properly disclosed in the specification. 6 As the Federal Circuit has con-
cisely stated, a patentee "is entitled to claims as broad as the prior art and
his disclosure will allow. '6 These limits exist in patent doctrine as the
nonobviousness, enablement, and written description requirements.
The novelty and nonobviousness requirements pertain to the public do-
main (known in patent parlance as "the prior art"). These doctrines prevent
63the patentee from removing existing knowledge from the public domain. A
patentee may not claim what is already known (novelty), 64 or such an obvious
variant of prior knowledge that it was effectively known (nonobviousness). 6
For example, if we already have metal doorknobs, it would require very little
effort to construct clay doorknobs using the same technique, and thus neither
are patentable. 66
The enablement requirement in theory ties the scope of patent claims to
the disclosure of the patent specification. A patentee that invents a barely
working incandescent lamp using carbonized paper (a horrible material for
lighting) should not be able to claim a monopoly on every form of artificial
67lighting that might ever be developed. Instead, the patentee is required to
enable a person of ordinary skill to make and use "[t]he full scope of the
claimed invention. '6s The inventor may only claim what his disclosure al-
lows other people to make and use: if he only discloses a badly working
lamp using carbonized paper, then he can only claim badly working lamps
using carbonized paper.69
Similar to enablement, the written description requirement requires the
patentee to have "possession" of the claimed invention at the time of filing,
61. Other limitations on claims include that the claim must be directed to patentable subject
matter, which is broadly formulated as "anything under the sun that is made by man." Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). The claimed invention must also be useful, but the test is
very lax. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
62. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 E3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In
re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
63. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,6 (1966).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
65. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
66. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851).
67. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
68. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
69. Incandescent Lamp, 159 U.S. at 476.
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as demonstrated by the disclosure of the specification.0 This serves an iden-
tical purpose to the enablement requirement": to prevent undue expansion
of claimed monopoly scope beyond the inventor's contribution contained in
the specification disclosure." Unsurprisingly, the "two requirements usually
rise and fall together."
73
Given enough chances, a patentee can always reach (eventually) the
maximum bounds permitted by the criteria of patentability. Thus, the pat-
entee effectively has the ability to exclude anything that he "possessed"
through the specification and that was not rendered obvious by the prior art:
Long-Run Coverage = Specification - Prior Art
These long-term limits on patentee rights matter far more than the lit-
eral-claim language today. A competitor who is about to invest millions of
dollars building a factory making three-legged tables for twenty years cares
little about whether he may sell those tables today-he cares more about
whether he will be able to sell those tables for the next twenty years. And
the answer to that question depends not on whether the patent claim today
covers three-legged tables, but on whether the claim can be changed to
cover them later.
What this means is that the boundaries that matter are the specification
disclosure and the prior art. The claim language, because it can be changed
at will, is irrelevant in the longrun. Notably, the PTO is already forced to
conduct searches based on the scope of possible amendment, treating this as
the patent boundary.74
70. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
71. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Rader, J., concurring) ("[T]o enable is to show possession, and to show possession is to enable.");
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 146-47 (2006) (arguing that
enablement should be conceptualized as possession); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Con-
tending with the "Written Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure
Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 62-63 (2000) (arguing that no court "has ever articulated a
persuasive rationale for distinguishing the written description requirement from the enablement
requirement"); see also Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2009 WL 2573004
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2009) (granting en bane rehearing to determine the continued vitality of the
written description requirement).
72. E.g., Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Historically, the
purposes and results of the two doctrines were different. Enablement policed initial claim scope,
while written description policed only expansion of claim scope through later amendment. The
difference was that an original claim was not subject to the written description requirement. In re
Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 823 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The Federal Circuit discarded this distinction in Regents
of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
73. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
74. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 904.03 (8th ed. rev. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP] ("It is normally not enough that references be se-
lected to meet only the terms of the claims alone .... [T]he search should, insofar as possible, also




The fact that the prior art and the specification really define the pat-
entee's rights is highly problematic. As mentioned earlier,75 claims are
supposed to provide simple and certain answers to the determination of
whether something will be covered by the patent so that competitors may
safely sell-and the public can safely buy-a product that is not covered.
But determining whether a product is part of the prior art, or (in)adequately
described by the specification, is neither easy nor certain.
The prior-art limitation is highly uncertain. First, it is difficult to deter-
mine the content of prior art because the universe of prior art is
extraordinarily vast.76 Second, the legal doctrines regarding the prior-art
limitation are also inherently vague. The nonobviousness doctrine was fa-
mously described by Learned Hand as "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward,
and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal con-
cepts. 77
If obviousness is the most nebulous concept in patent law, then enable-
ment and written description is a close second. Taken literally, the rule that
the patentee can only claim what his disclosure allows other people to make
and use is relatively clear and easy to apply.7s The complication comes from
the fact that every claim of necessity covers more. 79 The Wright Brothers
invented the airplane, but they couldn't make and use a modem jet fighter,
because aluminum frames and jet engines were not available back then. Wil-
liam Shockley may have invented the transistor in 1947,s° but he couldn't
make a modem transistor used in computers, which are much smaller. If I
invent a table in an era before plastic, and then plastic is developed, then do
I get to claim a plastic table? If I do, then I obtain a monopoly over some-
thing that my specification did not allow other people to make and use at the
time it was filed, or, in other words, something that I did not enable or in-
vent.8 ' If I do not, then my patent is worthless, because the core idea (of
a table) can be misappropriated the minute that a new material is discov-
ered.s2 Enablement and written description therefore contain two directly
75. See supra text accompanying note 23..
76. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that a single thesis in a
university library is prior art); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding that a patent
application kept only on microfilm in the Australian patent office is prior art).
77. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
78. Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61
N.YU. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 151 (2005) (arguing that literal claims are limited to technology existing
at the time of the application).
79. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008) (pointing out that "[a]ll claims are of infinite scope").
80. See U.S. Patent No. 2,502,488 (filed Sept. 24, 1948) (issued April 4, 1950).
81. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 119-21 (arguing that literal-claim scope should be fixed on
the date of filing). But see Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-
Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493
(2008) (arguing that claim language can remain fixed while its meaning grows to encompass new
embodiments).
82. See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CoRP. L.
1083 (2009) (discussing the enablement problems with after-arising technology).
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contradictory lines of cases.83 One line holds that every claimed embodiment
must be disclosed by the specification,4 an impossible requirement that ren-
ders every patent either invalid or completely worthless. The other line holds
that a single working embodiment enables everything," which places no
limit whatsoever on patent scope. Because the cases are irreconcilable, par-
ties who attempt to derive boundaries from the specification can have little
sense of what the enablement and written description doctrines would per-
mit a claim to reach. And that is after they wade through the complex and
technical disclosure of the specification itself, which is also a cumbersome
and expensive task.
The uncertainty problem can be highlighted by considering a claim writ-
ten as follows:
I claim whatever is enabled and described by the specification, and that is
not made obvious by the prior art.
This is a so-called "omnibus claim," and has long been prohibited 6 The
reasons for this prohibition are obvious. Such an omnibus claim says noth-
ing useful." A patent with an omnibus claim is not different from a patent
with no claims at all, or a claim saying "I claim what the law allows me to
claim."
At the same time, an omnibus claim has advantages. An omnibus claim
renders all other claims unnecessary. It automatically self-adjusts to reach
the patentee's maximum possible scope, and no more. The discovery of new
prior art will automatically shrink the claim (since it claims only that which
is "not made obvious by the prior art"). Allowing omnibus claims thus
would make patent examination and claim construction also unnecessary.
The PTO need not consider whether the patent is new, because it only
claims what is new, and if there is nothing new the patent would claim noth-
ing. Courts need not construe vague claim language, since there is no claim
language of any substance to construe."
The sum of the situation is that if the legal requirements of novelty,
nonobviousness, enablement and written description themselves provided
83. See Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the
New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3 (discussing the split in Federal Circuit's enablement doc-
trine).
84. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Auto.
Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim
Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
85. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
one method of making invention enough to enable); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d
1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[A] broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodi-
ment....").
86. Intermountain Research & Eng'g Co. v. Hercules Inc., 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 390, 393 n.2
(C.D. Cal. 1969).
87. Exparte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1612 (B.P.A.I. 1993).
88. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent




the requisite certainty and predictability-if both patentee and accused in-
fringer could know, at the time of patent filing, what a claim to "what the
law entitles the patentee to claim" would really entail, then there would be
nothing wrong with an omnibus claim. But precisely because the legally
maximum scope of a patent is extremely costly and difficult to determine, so
the written claim evolved as an alternative mechanism to determine the
boundary. Unlimited claim changing ex post, however, allows the patentee
to circumvent this mechanism and achieve omnibus claim scope through the
back door. This is because the scope of the patentee's ability to change is
precisely whatever is enabled and described by the specification, and that is
not made obvious by the prior art. 9
The irony of the situation is that current policy achieves the worst of all
possible worlds. Written claims create benefits of notice and definition in
boundaries, but require significant administrative and judicial resources to90
examine and construe. Having no claims (or omnibus claims) would create
significant uncertainty, but at least would save us the trouble of examining
written claims, allowing us to shut down the PTO and eliminate claim
construction disputes from the judicial docket. The present situation, how-
ever, requires us to spend all the resources of examining and construing
written claims, but then discards all the notice and definition benefits
when the patentees can change the claim whenever the result is unfavorable.
The next Part discusses the function of written claims (and how ex post
changing undermines these functions) in more detail.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF CHANGING CLAIMS
A. The Functions of Written Claims
1. A History of Claiming
In asking what functions the patent claim serves, it is helpful to consider
the counterexample of a regime where there were no claims. Such an exam-
ple is easily available, because historically patents did not have claims.9'
Instead, patent infringement was determined by comparing the embodiment
of the patentee's invention-such as a physical four-legged table-with the
accused product, using the criterion of whether the two were "substantially,
in their principles and mode of operation, like the plaintiff's. 92
This vague test of "substantial similarity" was unhelpful to everyone. For
patentees, it carried the risk that juries would be misled by the superficial
89. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
90. See Elizabeth D. Laporte, Managing the Runaway Patent Case, Ass'N OF Bus. TRIAL
LAWYERS REPORT, Jan. 2008, at 1, 6 ("Many judges and practitioners believe that the average patent
case consumes at least ten times the judicial resources as the typical civil case.").
91. See William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH.
L. REV. 755, 758 (1948) (tracing the first patent claims to Robert Fulton's patent on the steamboat).
92. Odiome v. Winldey, 18 F Cas. 581,582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814).
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differences between two devices. Thus insubstantial changes may allow
infringers to copy the core idea while avoiding infringement. For accused
infringers, it carried the risk that patentees would be rewarded with nonin-
novative parts of a complex device, and it would be impossible to
determine ahead of time what was being patented versus what was already
known.94
An example of these problems is Evans v. Eaton.95 In Evans, the patent
described a "Hopperboy" machine with some improvements. 9 Obviously,
there were no claims.97 The problem is that it was unclear whether the "in-
vention" was the entire machine or some subpart.The Court was troubled
by the fact that it was difficult to separate the supposedly inventive "im-
provement" from the machine as a whole, since the entire machine was
described by the specification, and the patent was thus "mixing up the new
and old":
[C]an the doctrine ... be maintained, that no specification of an improve-
ment is necessary in the patent; and that it is sufficient if it be made out
and shown at the trial, or may be established by comparing the machine
specified in the patent with former machines in use?... How can that be a
sufficient specification of an improvement in a machine, which does not
distinguish what the improvement is, nor state in what it consists, nor how
far the invention extends? Which .... mixing up the new and old, [ ] does
not in the slightest degree explain what is the nature or limit of the im-
provement which the party claims as his own? ... [W]e are of opinion that
[the patentee] ought to describe what his own improvement is, and to limit
his patent to such improvement."
From Evans and similar cases, the requirement of explicit claims
arose,'0 and was included in the Patent Act of 1836.10' Explicit claims al-
lowed the invention (and the scope of the patent) to be determined with
more ease and certainty, for patentees and their competitors alike. Moreover,
claims provided a written record of what the patentee regarded as his inven-
tion at the time he filed the patent, and which the Court suggested should be
93. John F Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 273, 309-10.
94. See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 134, 138-
40(1938).
95. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
96. Id. at 427-28.
97. Oliver Evans's patent was issued in 1808, before the development of modem claims. See
Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 455 (1818). It did contain a sentence stating: "I claim the
exclusive right to the principles, and to all the machines above specified, and for all the uses and
purposes specified...... Id. at 515 (quoting Evans's "Hopperboy patent").
98. Evans, 20 U.S. at 428.
99. id. at 433-35.
100. Woodward, supra note 91, at 759.
101. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (requiring that a patentee "particularly spec-




binding upon the patentee."" These advantages of claims remain relevant
today, but have been undercut by the availability of claim amendment.
2. The Notice Function
The primary function attributed to modem claims is the "notice" func-
tion. By this, courts mean that claims provide a manner for potential• 103
competitors to determine what products would infringe ahead of time.
Since competitors have access to issued claims, they can create products that
fall outside those claims and thereby not infringe patents.
Although it is frequently emphasized that the claims provide public no-
tice of the limits of the patentee's monopoly, it is important to note that
public access is not the heart of the notice function of claims. To be sure,
issued claims are publicly accessible,'0° and without such access claims
would serve no notice function at all. But the public could also discern the
permissible scope of a patentee's invention during the preclaiming era. As
the patentee in Evans pointed out, all that a potential competitor needed to
do was take the machine described by the patent specification, and "corn-
par[e] the machine specified in the patent with former machines in use."'0'5 In
other words, a competitor could read the patent specification, figure out
what is enabled and described, and then subtract from that everything al-
ready in the prior art, and be left with the patent's limits-the broadest
potential coverage of the patent. Both the patent specification and the prior
art are publicly accessible to potential competitors. 06
The true advantage of claims in providing public notice is that they
achieve this notice of patent limits more cheaply and with better certainty
than the specification-minus-prior-art method.10 7 Although the prior art is
publicly available, it is very difficult and expensive for a competitor to ex-
haustively search all prior art;' °8 while a claim can be cheaply accessed on
the PTO website or on paper. Although the specification can be analyzed by
a competitor, it is inherently uncertain because it mixes the old with the new,
is full of complex jargon and disclosures, and is very long; while each claim
102. Evans, 20 U.S. at 435 ("[H]e ought to describe what his own improvement is, and to
limit his patent to such improvement.").
103. PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("[Cllaims serve the important notice function of informing the public that anyone who makes, uses,
or sells the claimed invention infringes the patent.").
104. 35 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (publication of patents).
105. Evans, 20 U.S. at 433.
106. Prior art generally must be public. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829).
Only limited exceptions to this requirement exist. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), (g)(2) (2006).
107. See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIo ST. L.J. 473, 509
(2005) (arguing for "cheap, useful, and clear delineation of property rights").
108. See Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) ("[Claims] re-
liev[ed] the courts from the duty of ascertaining the exact invention of the patentee by inference and
conjecture, derived from a laborious examination of previous inventions, and a comparison thereof
with that claimed by him.").
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is supposed to be a crisp, single sentence.' °9 And analyzing the specification
and prior art using the legal doctrines of enablement, written description and
obviousness causes great uncertainty because the legal doctrines are amor-
phous standards; while each claim is supposed to be a bright-line rule.
The cost and certainty advantages of claims (versus a detailed analysis
of the specification and prior art) only hold, however, if claims impose mea-
ningful limitations on patentees and truly protect competitors. Claims that
are easily changed with retroactive effect provide no such protection: a
competitor who relies on claims falls squarely into a trap when the amended
claim issues and covers his product, forcing him to abandon his newly built
factory. The wily competitor should either spend the money to analyze the
specification and prior art; or simply give up and treat patent infringement
as a cost of doing business. Overwhelmingly, it appears that competitors in
practice choose the latter option and ignore patents until sued, in the belief
that paying infringement damages ex post is cheaper than analyzing patents
ex ante.' Neither option, of course, is a desirable outcome.
3. The Definitional Function
A second function served by claims is known as the "definitional" func-
tion. Primarily, this refers simply to the doctrine that claims are supposed to
define the boundaries of the patent,"' which makes this function almost in-
distinguishable from the notice function. Claims offer definition, however,
in that they require the patentee to detail his own invention." 2 As the Su-
preme Court said in the famous case of Merrill v. Yeomans,"3 "nothing can
be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the
former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has in-
vented."' 14
The fact that claims cover his own invention gives the patentee an in-
formational advantage."5 Better than anyone else, the patentee should know
what he actually invented, at the time he filed the patent application:
[Tihe patentee is conclusively presumed to have known what he invented
or discovered, better than did any one else, at the time he applied for a pat-
ent. This is true, even though subsequent students may perceive ... that he
disclosed methods, means, or processes having capabilities surpassing the
109. MPEP, supra note 74, § 608.01(m).
110. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21-22.
111. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 49, 65 (2005).
112. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 435 (1822).
113. 94 U.S. 568 (1877).
114. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573-74.
115. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. Rev. 465, 496-97




inventor's dreams at the time attempt was made to put achievements into
words.'1
6
Claims therefore act as an "information forcing" mechanism," 7 to en-
courage patentees to disclose their own understanding of the invention, early
on at the time of filing. Original claims are more "honest" than later claims
in describing what the patentee really invented, in the same way that early
testimony is usually regarded as more honest than later contradictory testi-• 118
mony from the same witness. Allowing later amendments to control,however, discards the valuable information elicited through original claims.
B. The Definition Function and Patentee Incentives
One important motivation for patentees to amend claims is to incorpo-
rate later-discovered information. Precisely because original claims reflect
the patentee's honest assessment of what they invented, the original claims
often prove to be quite disadvantageous to patentees in hindsight, as new
circumstances challenge old assumptions. What the patentee thought would
become valuable turns out to be worthless; what the patentee thought would
be worthless in his specification turns out to be very valuable.
A good example is Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co."9
In Crown Cork, the patentee Warth filed an initial patent application on a
process for making bottle caps. The patentee emphasized and claimed the
benefit of using simultaneous heat and pressure to seal the cap. As an
aside, the patent noted that it may be desirable to "preheat" the assembled
crown. Warth initially thought that preheating was not worth protecting-he
cancelled claims that would have covered it.'2 ' Subsequently, however, a
competitor Johnson obtained a patent on preheated caps. As a lower court
noted, "had it not been for this competitor, Warth might never have consid-
ered the subject [of preheating] worth claiming as an invention."
2 3
The fact that a competitor made preheating bottle caps commercially
valuable induced Warth to resurrect his claims on preheating through a con-
tinuation. Warth amended his claims to become exact copies of Johnson's "
116. Kintner v. At. Commc'n Co., 240 F. 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1917).
117. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 98 (1989) ("[W]hen the rationale is to inform the rela-
tively uninformed contracting party, the penalty default should be against the relatively informed
party."); see also Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 609-11 (1990) (discussing information-forcing rules).
118. Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[A] party's affidavit which
contradicts his own prior deposition testimony should be disregarded ... .
119. 304 U.S. 159 (1938).
120. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 304 U.S. at 162.
121. Id. at 163.
122. Id. at 164.




Thus a priority dispute evolved between Warth, who first thought of the fea-
ture but attached no importance to it, and Johnson, who was later in time,
but appreciated the value of preheating. In this contest between inventors,
the Supreme Court awarded the patent to Warth. '25 Johnson therefore re-
ceived nothing from the patent system for his efforts; instead he became an
infringer.' 26
Amending claims ex post to capture inventions whose commercial value
becomes apparent later through the efforts of others is widely seen as un-
fair. 127 Robert Merges has dubbed this practice "misappropriation by
amendment."'28 The essential defect is that, although the patentee must dis-
close the later-claimed invention in some form to sustain the amendment,
the written description requirement allows this initial disclosure to be vague,
cursory, and buried within a laundry list.'29 It is Johnson who really contrib-
uted the idea of using preheating to society, since without Johnson it is
highly unlikely that anyone (least of all Warth) would have bothered to no-
tice a stray line buried in a patent specification sitting among millions of
issued patents. Given retroactive claim amendments, however, it is Warth
who received all the reward, and Johnson who paid the penalty.
To say that the result is "unfair," however, lacks rigor. Patent holders
have a different view of the equities. After all, the patentee was the first per-
son to write the feature down on paper-they were the first "inventor" of
the later claimed feature in some sense. Patentees often have no idea
whether they invented anything valuable when filing for patents,130 and
thus a wait-and-see position in refining claims to match market develop-
ments helps patentees focus resources on the most valuable inventions. A
court sympathetic to patentees can easily see omissions in original claims
as standard patent-prosecution practice, 131 while regarding competitors
who rely on such omissions as brazen pirates who deserve no sympathy
(though it is by no means clear that Johnson or many other infringers actu-
ally copied the invention by examining the patent).' 32 Because unfairness is
125. Id. at 165.
126. Id. at 161.
127. See, e.g., Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at Ill (opining that allowing patentees to
obtain claims covering "a competitor's product where the patentee had not contemplated the em-
bodiment prior to seeing the competitor's device [is] a particularly offensive practice").
128. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEx.
L. REV. 1627, 1653 (2007).
129. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 E2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that draw-
ings with no description were sufficient to meet disclosure requirements); Snitzer v. Etzel, 465 F.2d
899, 902 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that one ion selected ex post from eighty-seven billion disclosed
variants was properly claimed).
130. See Schreiner & Doody, supra note 10, at 557.
131. See In re Wilder, 736 E2d 1516, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[F]ailure to appreciate the full
scope of the invention is one of the most common sources of defects in patents.").
132. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 243 (1832) (stating that defects in a patent are




in the eyes of the beholder, and following the spirit of Crown Cork, the
Federal Circuit has strongly endorsed the practice of using retroactive
amendment to capture new information:
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent appli-
cation for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor's
product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or in-
sert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the applicant's
attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.
Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all statutes and regu-
lations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the marketplace is simply
irrelevant .... "'
A more concrete way of approaching the problem, besides the simple
appeal to fairness, is from patent law's economic purpose. Patents exist to
"promote the Progress of ... useful Arts,'"'3 a mandate that has made this
area of law particularly well suited to economic and utilitarian analysis.'35
The question, then, is whether allowing claim amendments that capture later
insights promotes the incentive of patentees to invent and disclose their dis-
coveries, as compared to the cost of that incentive on society.
Allowing patentees to capture new insights by competitors through ex
post claiming increases their return on the patent. All else being equal, this
should increase the incentive to invent and disclose. The question is by how
much, and the answer is very little. The unpredictability of later windfalls
means that practically no one would make investments in reliance upon
them. On the other hand, increasing the patentee's return on a patent also
increases the monopoly cost on society and reduces the reward to legitimate
competitors. As mentioned before, Johnson received nothing in return for
making preheating well known and valuable-instead he had to pay
Warth-and this surely discourages others from following in Johnson's
footsteps. The costs of claim amendments and captured insights, therefore,
can be very great. As discussed below, the benefits and costs of claim
amendments accrue in different ways, resulting in a disparity between them.
1. Unequal Discounting and Patent Incentives Versus Cost
The standard economic model of patents holds that patents provide an
incentive to invent and disclose some useful product or process by providing• • 136
a time-limited monopoly over the same invention. The monopoly thuscreates both a benefit and corresponding cost. A very lucrative monopoly
133. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (emphasis added).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) ("The stated objec-
tive of the Constitution ... is to 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' The patent laws
•.. have a positive effect on society ... by way of increased employment and better lives for our
citizens.").
136. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
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(e.g., Edison's monopoly over the incandescent lamp) confers strong incen-
tive benefits, and imposes large societal costs, since everyone must pay
inflated prices to the patentee.
37
The benefits and costs of the patent monopoly usually go hand-in-
hand.' A $100 monopoly profit paid to the patentee creates the incentive,
but comes out of consumer pockets with a resulting deadweight lOSS.' 39 But
there are two important features that affect this link between benefit and
cost. First, the incentives are directed to private individuals, in that they af-
fect individual patentees, but the costs are social, in that they are borne by
the entire society in paying inflated prices. Second, the incentive effect oc-
curs at distinct points in time. The patentee must make an upfront
investment in research and development early, and reaps the monopoly prof-
its only later. The process is affected by uncertainty, and the patentee must
make research investments based on expected monopoly profits. In eco-
nomic terms, he must discount the future revenue stream by an appropriate
adjustment for risk.
Thus, suppose in the year 2019, a patent on an invention is expected to
yield a $100 monopoly profit. A putative inventor, however, has to make a
decision whether to pursue the invention in 2009. To the inventor in 2009,
the prospect of $100 in ten years is worth much less than $100 today. In
addition to the time value of money, there is the possibility that the expected
$100 might never materialize at all. The research and development efforts
may fail, or the invention may not be as successful as one initially
thought. Because people are assumed to be risk averse,141 the inventor to-
day will not spend $100 in research and development. At a 10 percent risk142
discount rate, he will spend only $38.56.
137. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 885-88 (1990) (discussing the costs of patent monopoly on the early electric
lighting industry).
138. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 476, 479 (1953) ("[A] patent is a monopoly because its only value as an incentive de-
pends upon securing to its owner monopoly power....").
139. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 61 (3d
ed. 2004).
140. Or it may perform unexpectedly better and be more valuable than initially expected. The
aversion to variance, not simple downside loss, is the economic concept of risk aversion. See Mi-
chael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Increasing Risk: L A Definition, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 225, 226
(1970).
141. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
25 (2005) (explaining that risk aversion is the standard assumption in patent law). But see F.M.
Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 15-19 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2001) (arguing that some patentees are not risk averse); Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery:
Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 161 (2008)
(arguing that individuals are more sensitive to the size of the maximum reward than the probability
of attaining it).
142. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 296 n.2 (2003) (noting that a 10 percent discount seems "appropriate
in light of the uncertainty associated with income from intellectual property").
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Although the patentee receives his reward only after issuance, he must
assess the value of this reward much earlier, when he is making decisions.
The decision to research a patentable invention necessarily occurs before
filing a patent on it, and the decision to disclose that invention is made by
filing. Thus, the relevant time point for assessing the incentive benefit of a
patent is, at the latest, the time of filing. A risk discount must be applied
throughout the period between original filing and the later receipt of the
reward.
The fact that benefits must be reduced by a risk discount, itself, cannot
be a strong objection to patentee appropriation of later competitor innova-
tions and insights. All patent outcomes are subject to some level of
uncertainty,'" as are other property rights. 45 If the discounting of incentive
benefits is a problem, it is a problem that occurs throughout all of intellec-
tual property law.
The problem is not that the patentee's rewards from capturing future
competitor insights must be discounted for risk, but that the discount is par-
ticularly high. The more uncertain a particular outcome at the relevant
decision point, the higher the risk discount rate.' 46 At the time of patent fil-
ing, future insights such as the commercial success of a feature are by
definition unknown to the patentee.147 To the extent that the patentee already
believes a feature will become commercially successful, or that the patentee
intends to exploit the feature himself, he will include it in an original claim.
Thus, the developments subject to claim amendment are necessarily those
that are unforeseen and uncertain.
The lure of permitting amended claims to an inventor at the point of fil-
ing thus reduces to this vague promise: "[i]f someone else comes up with
anything good, and if it vaguely resembles what is in your patent specifica-
tion, we will give you a chance to change your claim to cover it.",' 41 Whether
competitors will have any insights, and whether those insights will prove to
143. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Boumonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 401 (1926) (comment-
ing that, upon filing, the patentee had "done all that he could do to make his description public").
144. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 95 (2005);
see also Russell F.R. Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the
Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175 (2003) (discussing the problems
of valuing patent rights and proposing an option-based model).
145. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1295-99 (2008) (discussing limits on the ex ante certainty of scope
for all property).
146. See HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF IN-
VESTMENTS 129 (rev. ed. 1991).
147. See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEo. L.J. 1947, 1993 (2005) ("Since
entry [of an unclaimed competitor product] is unforeseen and does not occur until the second pe-
riod, the effect on the incentive to invent is muted.").
148. An important assumption underlying this analysis is that inventors regard a monopoly
with a defined scope as more predictable than one with an undefined scope. Of course, even a de-
fined monopoly over a particular set of embodiments (e.g., all tables) has considerable commercial
uncertainty (i.e., it is unknown whether tables will sell), so the patentee's monetary return is always
uncertain. The analysis holds, however, so long as the uncertainty is reduced.
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be very valuable or virtually worthless, is subject to tremendous uncertainty
at the time of patent filing, due to its inherent unpredictability as a future
event.1
49
To be sure, even a vague and speculative promise of future benefit will
have some prefiling incentive effects.' 50 But this incentive is very small after
risk discounting and is entirely disproportionate to the monopoly cost in-
curred.' Society gets very little prefiling incentive bang for the later
monopoly cost buck.
For a fair comparison, the relevant cost must be discounted too. The fact
that the patentee can expect a $100 monopoly profit in 2019 requires that
the same profit be paid by consumers. Even a certain cost of $100 in ten
years is not worth that amount today-we can invest $61.39 in a bank at 5
percent interest for ten years, and be virtually guaranteed to have $100 to
pay the cost when it arises.
The difference-$38.56 in benefit versus $61.39 in cost-is created by
different rates of discounting. The lower discounting of costs arises because
the costs of the patent system are borne socially-reducing consumer wel-
fare for society as a whole. For society as a whole, there are large numbers
of patentees, large numbers of competitors, and large numbers of consum-
ers; the law of large numbers allows us to consider this average cost of the
patent system to be a virtual certainty. This cost includes the cost of permit-
ting claim amendments that misappropriate future competitor insights, since
some competitors of some patentees will surely have insights to appropriate
(for each individual patentee, the uncertainty is whether his particular com-
petitors will have insights, which is much less certain). The monopoly costs
of amending claims, as a feature of the patent system, are therefore subject
to the low social discount rate, usually considered to be the risk-free rate. -
3
To illustrate the difference between public and private discounting, sup-
pose that we have a society with 100 patentees each holding one patent, and
100 consumers. Of the 100 patents, one single patent will strike the jackpot
through an amendment, resulting in a $100 monopoly profit, and each con-
149. See Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (2005)
(granting rights "projects an enormous shadow across the future, one whose size cannot even be
contemplated at the time of the invention").
150. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214-15 (2003) (finding ex ante incentive from the
expectation of future lengthening of copyright).
151. See id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "a 1% likelihood of earning $100 an-
nually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today"). Justice
Breyer's calculation was made with a 7 percent discount rate. Id. at 268. Given the degree of uncer-
tainty involved, the discount rate for ex post claiming is likely to be a great deal higher. Cf William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 481
n.22 (2003) (noting that incentive benefits and monopoly costs might be discounted at different
rates).
152. The economic harm of the $100 monopoly profit is the deadweight loss created by re-
ducing output. This deadweight loss is generally proportionate to, but not the same as, the monopoly
profit. See CHIsUM ET AL., supra note 139, at 61 (illustrating relationship between monopoly profit
and deadweight loss). The example is a simplification.
153. See generally K. J. Arrow & R. C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public In-
vestment Decisions, 60 Am. EcON. REV. 364 (1970).
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sumer will pay $1 to that lucky patentee. For each patentee, the average
value of the jackpot is $1 ($100. 1%); but the risk-adjusted value is less
than $1 due to patentee risk aversion. For each consumer, the cost is a cer-
tain $1, and no risk discounting applies because the eventuality is certain
(the uncertainty is to whom the $1 will be paid, about which consumers do
not care). The difference in private and social risk discounting thus creates a
disparity between the discount rates applied to incentive benefit and cost.
The problem of appropriating later-developed competitor insights is that
the inherent uncertainty of postfiling events magnifies this discount rate dif-
ferential. For each individual patentee, the prefiling anticipated benefit of
appropriating competitor innovation is minimal, since it is grossly uncertain
whether his competitors will have any insights worth taking. For society as a
whole, however, it is almost certain that some competitor to some patentee
will have insights that are later going to be misappropriated, and the average
cost of amending a claim is therefore subject to discounting at a much lower
rate.
2. The Problem as Applied to Narrowing Amendments
The problem of claim amendments that expand scope into unforeseen
developments is most easily understood when claims are (1) broadened and
(2) to capture new competitor products. This is the phenomenon that has
attracted the most criticism in past literature.154 And the limitation on
broadening but not narrowing amendments during reissuance and
reexamination proceedings reflects .this common view: that amending
claims to nominally cover more things is more harmful than a claim
amendment to cover fewer things.1 5 But neither distinction makes much
sense. Instead, the disparity between benefit and cost arises equally in every
instance of amendments to capture unforeseeable developments or, in other
words, patentee windfalls.
56
Unforeseeable developments that create high discount rates are not lim-
ited to competitor insights or competitor products, at least under a strict
view of who the patentee's competitors are. New technological contexts and
unforeseen commercial value are common with the passage of time. A re-
cent example is the development of the internet giving unforeseen windfalls
to many patents on old networking technology."7 The very fact that a claim
is amended tends to suggest that the amendment is reacting to something
unforeseen. After all, if the patentee had foreseen a particular development,
he would have attempted to account for it through an original claim-at
154. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at Il l; Merges, supra note 128, at 1653-54.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
156. See Parchomovsky et al., supra note 12, at 756-57, for a definition of windfalls.
157. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995) (the patent at issue in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), covering electronic trading); cf PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting attempt to expand patent on vending
machines to cover T-Mobile's "Wi-Fi hotspots" found in places such as Starbucks and airports).
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least if the expected value of the future development was worth more than
the small cost of adding a marginal claim. And the fact of unforeseeability
means that the patentee's incentive at filing for capturing unexpected later
developments is small, while the social costs remain large.'58
Nor does capturing unforeseeable information always result in broaden-
ing of claim language. One common category of claim amendments,
probably the most common and important, are narrowing amendments to
avoid unknown prior art that is discovered after filing. 59 This category raises
the same problem of giving patentees undue windfalls, just as when they
appropriate later-developed competitor insights. The key understanding is
that although prior art necessarily exists before filing (since it is prior art),
the patentee's knowledge of it almost always occurs after filing. Thus, the
discovery of unforeseen prior art is postfiling information that does not
meaningfully contribute to prefiling incentives.
The universe of prior art is vast, and a patentee cannot realistically know
that his claims are patentable over all prior art at the time of filing. Although
the patentee can certainly believe some features of his specification disclo-
sure to be novel over the prior art, those will be the features in his original
claims. The features emphasized by a claim amendment are likely to be
those features that were originally thought to matter little, but acquire new
significance after the unexpected discovery of new prior art. For example,
the patentee may have initially claimed to have invented the computer
mouse. Upon discovering that a one-button computer mouse already exists,
however, the patentee may change his claim, to now claim that he invented a
two-button computer mouse. This newfound emphasis on "two-button" mice
raises the same windfall concerns.
The twist that makes the incentive problem less intuitive in cases of un-
foreseen prior art is that a patentee seeking to avoid prior art will usually
seek to narrow an existing claim (i.e. to cover fewer things). In particular,
the narrowing amendment will omit the particular prior-art device, such as a
change from covering all mice to covering just two-button mice in order to
exclude a one-button mouse. This is in contrast to amendments trying to
cover competitor insights, which usually seek to broaden the existing claim
to cover more things. But whether an amendment is broadening or narrow-
ing, the effect is to expand the patent monopoly and its costs. The key is to
understand the difference between nominal claim language (what the claim
purports to cover) and legal claim scope. A nominally broad claim that is
158. Meurer & Nard, supra note 147, at 1998 ("[A]n inventor's incentive is not harmed much
when, ex post, she is denied patent scope over technology that she did not foresee ex ante."); see
also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569
(2009) (applying similar analysis to copyright law).
159. See Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit During 1991, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 869, 885 (1992) ("The temptation is great to
amend claims after the original filing to avoid newly discovered prior art and yet encompass post-
filing date evolving technology, as well as provide broad coverage of embodiments that turn out to
be commercially important.").
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invalid has no legal scope;'6° while a narrow claim that is valid has legal
scope corresponding to its language.
A nominally narrowing amendment to avoid prior art thus broadens the
legal scope of the claim, and increases its monopoly cost, because the
amendment transforms legal scope from zero to something greater. More-
over, about the only reason to ever file a narrowing claim amendment is to
avoid rejection or invalidity of the patent. 6'A narrowing amendment is thus
indistinguishable from a broadening amendment. Both increase patent scope
and monopoly cost. When done in response to unforeseen developments, all
amendments to claims postfiling create the same disparity between incentive
benefits (very low) and monopoly costs (not low), resulting in later wind-
falls to patent owners.
C. Risk of Drafting Mistakes and Efficient Allocation
A key assumption underlying my analysis in the previous Section is that
if a patentee had foreseen a particular development at the time of filing, he
would have incorporated that development into an original claim, at least if
the development were perceived as minimally valuable. One obvious re-
sponse is that the patentee may very well have attempted to do so-the
original claim was simply badly drafted. After all, drafting good claim lan-
guage is notoriously difficult: changing a single word can drastically affect
the scope of any particular claim.62 Therefore, the reasoning goes, claim
amendments should be liberally permitted to allow rectifying mistakes in
articulating what the patentee foresaw.
There seems little doubt that claim-drafting mistakes do happen. By
claim-drafting "mistake" in this Section, I mean the failure to cover what the
patentee had foreseen at filing, not a failed attempt to capture the unfore-
seen. A good example of likely mistake is Winans v. Adam. 63 In Winans, the
patentee invented coal cars that, by virtue of a circular shape, evenly distrib-
uted weight across the whole of the body of the car. 64 The patentee drafted a
claim that stated:
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters-patent, is
making the body of a car for the transportation of coal, &c., in the form of
a frustum of a cone, substantially as herein described, whereby the force
exerted by the weight of the load presses equally in all directions, and does
160. Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("An invalid patent
cannot be infringed.").
161. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002)
(noting that amendment is taken as a concession of invalidity of prior claim).
162. Lichtman, supra note 29, at 2016; see Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
163. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
164. Winans, 56 U.S. at 339.
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not tend to change the form thereof, so that every part resists its equal pro-
portion... ,6-
As the context of the claim makes clear, the emphasis of the invention
was on the principle of even distribution of weight. The patentee, however,
chose to use the word "cone" to describe the shape of his car. A later in-
fringer then copied the design, but used an octagonal coal car instead of a
perfectly circular one.'66 Based on any fair reading of the patentee's original
claim, we can safely say that the intent was to claim any shape that utilized
the principle of even weight distribution, including a variation that utilized
octagons instead of perfect circles. The inclusion of the word "cone" was a
mistake.
The issue is whether the ease of making claim-drafting mistakes should
necessarily mean that they be rectified through a claim amendment. Here,
there are competing fairness paradigms. The fact that the patentee makes a
claim-drafting mistake, and a competitor creates a product that falls just
outside the literal claim due to the mistake (e.g., creates an octagon instead
of a circle), is quite common. Two schools of thought have developed. Ac-
cording to one view, the accused infringer in such cases is simply a pirate
who exploits a minor error and claim amendments should be liberally per-
mitted. The Supreme Court's decision in Grant v. Raymond 67 aptly
illustrates this "antipirate" view:
An objection [to later amendment] much relied on is, that after the inven-
tion has been brought into general use, those skilled in the art or science
with which it is connected, perceiving the variance between the [claim]
and the [accused] machine, and availing themselves of it, may have con-
structed, sold and used the machine without infringing the legal rights of
the patentee, or incurring the penalties of the law. The new patent would
retro-act on them, and expose them to penalties to which they were not li-
able when the act was committed.
This objection is more formidable in appearance than in reality. It is not
probable that the defect in the [original claim] can be so apparent as to be
perceived by any but those who examine it for the purpose of pirating the
invention. They are not entitled to much favour. 1
8
Another view of the equities, however, holds that competitors are doing
precisely what we would hope. The accused infringer has read the patent,
understood its claims, and made a product that does not infringe the claim.
It is the same thing, only stated in different ways, to say that the competitor
is "exploiting a minor loophole" versus "relying on the notice function of
165. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 345.
167. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832).
168. Grant, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 243.
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the claim." The Supreme Court's decision in Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Na-
tional Nut Co.'69 is a concise statement of the "procompetition" view:
[Tihe claims of the original patent were limited as to the form of conveyor
.... [E]xpressly appreciating its limited character, indeed, being governed
therein by the advice of patent counsel, the defendant built a noninfringing
brick machine ... at a substantial expense, and put them into commercial
use on a large scale by extensively selling their product .... .70
The two lines of cases are fundamentally irreconcilable in spirit. In Wi-
nans, the original claim is limited as to the form of the car-as a cone-and
the competitor exploits this limitation by constructing a noninfringing car.
The Court condemns the competitor as a pirate.' 7 1 In Sontag, the Court con-
siders an original claim limited as to the form of a conveyor, and a
competitor who exploited this limitation by constructing a noninfringing
brick machine.7 2 The Court applauds this reliance on claims and holds that
the competitor should not only be shielded from preexisting liability, but
should have a continuing right to use the brick machine to make more
bricks.7
Nor is it useful to distinguish the cases based on the "substantiality" of
the difference between a patentee's claim and the competitor's device.7 4 The
competitor's device is always substantially different in the only way that
matters-it does not meet an element of the claim language. As the courts
have repeatedly emphasized, "there is no legally recognizable or protected
'essential' element, gist or 'heart' of' a claim. 75 Every word in a claim is
deemed to matter, and to label a particular element to be a "minor mistake"
instead of a significant one is just that: a conclusory label. Analytically, it is
almost impossible to discern the substantiality of a claim-drafting mistake.
The core dilemma boils down to this: Claim-drafting mistakes will be
made, and they will cause a loss. This loss is of the patentee's foreseen mo-
nopoly profits, which comes from excluding competitors, and either the
patentee or competitor must be made to bear this loss. If the patentee is
permitted to amend his claim to fix the mistake, then the competitor who
relied on the patent claim will be made to bear the loss by paying royalties,
reducing competitor incentive to rely on claims and create noninfringing
designs. If the patentee is not permitted to amend his claim, then the
169. 310 U.S. 281 (1940).
170. Sontag, 310 U.S. at 294 (quoting Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. Gen. Refractories Co., 27
F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1928)).
171. Winans, 56 U.S. at 344.
172. Sontag, 310 U.S. at 294-95 (endorsing the decision in Ashland Fire, 27 F.2d at 745-46).
173. Id.
174. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997) ("[Olne
wonders how ever to distinguish between the intentional copyist making minor changes ... and the
incremental innovator designing around the claims... ").
175. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quo-




patentee will bear the loss by having his legitimately expected monopoly
dissipated, with reduced incentives to invent. Both the patentee and the
competitor have self-serving appeals to fairness in why they should not bear
the loss. A more solid foundation to analyze the problem, aside from com-
peting appeals to fairness, once again appears in patent law's utilitarian
purpose and economic analysis.
The economic analysis of law already has a well-established framework
for the allocation of losses that result from mistakes: the economic analysis
of the tort system. The principles from tort law are fully applicable here be-
cause, reduced to their essentials, claim-drafting mistakes are just another
category of human error that cause later loss. The loss can be allocated to
one of two different parties, each of whom will respond to the loss alloca-
tion in different ways. As is usual in such cases, transaction costs preclude
an ex ante bargain that will make the allocation rule irrelevant under the
Coase theorem; 76 no competitor can pay putative patentees in advance to
not make claim-drafting mistakes, especially given that patent applications
are prosecuted in secret.
The economic rules regarding efficient allocation of loss from mistakes
are well established. If the mistake can be reasonably avoided, the loss
should be allocated to the party best able to avoid the mistake (i.e., the least-
cost avoider), creating a negligence rule. '7 If the mistake cannot be
reasonably avoided, the shifting of loss to a faultless party-a strict liability.... 178
system-only occurs when there is a compelling justification.
Which of these regimes best describes claim-drafting mistakes by pat-
entees would seem to vary by case. Some claim-drafting mistakes are surely
avoidable, and a negligence rule is appropriate for such cases. Other claim-
drafting mistakes, however, are not reasonably avoidable. The allocation of
loss between patentee and accused infringer is much harder in such cases,
though, as detailed below, I believe they should still remain on the patentee.
1. Avoidable Mistakes
In cases of avoidable mistakes causing loss, the optimal incentive is to
place the loss on the party best able to avoid the loss. 9 If I can best avoid an
accident by driving more carefully, I should bear the loss of failing to do so.
Similarly, if I can best avoid the future dissipation of monopoly profits
through better ex ante claim drafting, I should bear the loss for failing to do
so. This incentive structure is efficient for two reasons. First, the fact that the
negligent party bears the loss means that they will take precautions, such as
176. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON 1, 8 (1960).
177. GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135
(1970).
178. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377,
390-94 (2002).
179. CALABRESI, supra note 177, at 135-40.
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driving more carefully or drafting better claims.' s° Second, the opposite re-
gime (i.e., placing the loss on the nonnegligent party) will create perverse
incentives and moral hazards." ' If my negligent driving results in my victim
paying me for the damage to my car, I will tend to drive very recklessly. If
my negligent claim-drafting results in my competitor paying me royalties, I
will tend to draft very bad claims.
The loss here should be defined with some precision. The loss from a
claim-drafting mistake is the inadvertent omission of a foreseen product
from the claim, but the loss has no monetary value until a competitor makes
the inadvertently omitted product. It takes two (patentee and at least one
competitor) to dissipate a monopoly and its profits.'83 Which party-
patentee or competitor-is better able to avoid this loss?
In most cases, the patentee will be in a better position to avoid the loss,
due to several advantages in information. The patentee drafts his patent,
and is trying to delineate the scope of his own invention-the scope of what
he foresaw as the monopoly when determining incentives at filing.185 Any
competitors, by contrast, will be attempting to discern a deviance from this
patentee-subjective scope solely from reading the public record, comprised
of the patent and its prosecution history; and it is the patentee that creates
the record in the first place. If a mistake causes the claim to encompass less
than the patentee foresaw, the patentee has the best opportunity to avoid it.
In cases where the mistake is reasonably avoidable, therefore, the patentee
should generally bear the loss and be denied amendment to cure it.'86
What about the situation where the negligent mistake is obvious to eve-
ryone, patentee and competitor alike, and therefore the competitor is also at
fault for designing a product that encroaches upon the inadvertently omitted
domain? A good example of this is Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc. 187 In that
case, the patentee, Lemelson, claimed a "trackway" instead of a "toy track-
way," even though the entire patent specification was directed to a toy and
180. Id. at 135-38.
181. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 342-44 (5th ed. 2008).
182. The dissipation of the monopoly is a social loss because it reduces patent incentives, assum-
ing that the patent system induces more innovation benefit than it costs. Rich, supra note 138, at 479.
183. Cf. Coase, supra note 176, at 2 (noting that social costs are reciprocal).
184. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present
Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 99 (2003) ("[T]he patentee, as the drafter, is the least-
cost avoider of such ambiguities.").
185. See supra Part II.
186. One area where this negligence principle already operates is prosecution history estop-
pel, admittedly a narrow doctrine applied only when the claim language does not literally cover the
accused product and the claim language was amended in prosecution. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997). Patentees seeking to show that an alleged
feature is insubstantially different from an amended claim (and thus infringing) must show that they
"could not reasonably be expected to have drafted" a better claim. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002) . Previous literature has advocated expanding the
principle of claim refinement as reflected in this doctrine. See Meurer & Nard, supra note 147, at
1989-91.
187. 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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not a real trackway."' The defendant, Mattel, made a toy trackway. 9 The
mistake was easily avoidable with even minimal claim-drafting care; but it
was also surely the case that any competitor would understand the patent to
really be directed at toys. If the patentee made a clear mistake, does the ac-
cused infringer have a special obligation to avoid exploiting the mistake?
In tort parlance, this is the problem of contributory negligence, where
both parties have some ability to avoid the loss, and it is necessary to incen-
tivize both parties.'f 9 In patent law, however, true cases of optimal mutual
avoidance are rare, and judicial correction is available in such extraordinary
cases, as the court demonstrated in Lemelson. 9' It is by no means clear that
shifting the loss to accused infringers is optimal even in cases of mutual
avoidance, since the rule of contributory negligence left the loss where it• • 92
originally lay-with the patentee-to save administrative costs. But in any
case, the choice between contributory and comparative negligence is all but
irrelevant for patent law, because a genuine case of contributory negligence
like Lemelson is extremely rare. To have a comparative advantage in avoid-
ing dissipation of a foreseen monopoly, the accused infringer must know
two things (which were present in Lemelson): (1) the patentee omitted
something from the claim; and (2) the omitted thing was properly foreseen
and a legitimate part of the patentee's monopoly. Such a combination practi-
cally never exists in patent law.
The reason that contributory negligence rarely occurs is twofold: First,
an accused infringer usually cannot determine what a patentee omitted from
his maximum potential claim scope without an exhaustive search of prior art
and a detailed analysis of the specification.93 More importantly, even after
such a detailed analysis of maximum potential scope, the accused infringer
cannot know why the patentee failed to claim all the way to that theoretical
boundary. The patentee may claim less than the theoretical maximum be-
cause he: (1) did not foresee everything as being commercially worthwhile
to claim; (2) has knowledge of secret prior art that the accused infringer
lacks; 94 (3) simply dedicates some subject matter to the public; or (4) made
a mistake in claim drafting. Requiring the accused infringer to take steps to
avoid unclaimed-but-claimable subject matter assumes that the only reason
patentees fail to claim the full scope of their disclosure is by mistake, which
188. Lemelson, 968 F.2d at 1203 & n.3.
189. Id. at 1204.
190. See Mark F Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and
the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 16 (1988).
191. Lemelson, 968 F.2d at 1203 n.3 ("The deletion of 'toy' appears from the record of the
proceedings before the PTO to have been an inadvertent error... ); see also Group One, Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (allowing correction of errors "evident
from the face of the patent").
192. POSNER, supra note 34, at § 6.4
193. See supra text accompanying note 186.
194. Although most prior art is public, the patentee has special access to secret prior art cre-




is not true when "mistake" is defined to encompass only loss of foreseen
scope. (Courts, of course, have frequently given patentees the benefits of
their "mistakes" in failing to claim unforeseen developments. 95) Rather,
given the information advantages possessed by the patentee, the efficient
allocation seems to be to place responsibility to avoid losses on patentees.
This is particularly the case when considering that one patentee can avoid
the loss by claim-drafting improvement, whereas each of multiple competi-
tors must work to avoid it.
The current policy of liberal amendment creates precisely the opposite
regime in that it grants patentees the ability to cure their mistakes, and trans-
fers the loss to competitors by making them pay royalties. Not surprisingly,
the strict transfer of loss to the nonnegligent party-competitors who relied
on claim language-creates perverse incentives and moral hazards to draft
bad claims. When patentees profit from drafting misleading claims that can
be amended to ensnare competitors, they will intentionally do so. 96 When
patentees are not punished for drafting bad claims that are amended to en-
snare competitors, they will recklessly do so. Either way, patentees have
little incentive to draft good claims in the first place, resulting in vague-197
issued claims being a common problem. The incentives are so perverse
that patent attorneys dislike having an original claim granted without
amendment, and such immediate allowances will usually trigger a continua-
tion application to amend claims.'
2. Unavoidable Mistakes
A more difficult question is presented when the claim-drafting mistake
is not reasonably avoidable, i.e., no one has acted negligently.
Initially, the scope of this problem must be defined. A patentee is not en-
titled to capture by amendment a product that he did not foresee. This leaves
only the category of products that were foreseen but not claimed, and the
failure to claim something that was foreseen sounds almost like the very
definition of negligence. After all, why fail to claim something if you had
already foreseen it?' 99 Under this analysis, the category of unavoidable mis-
takes is basically a null set.2°° The purported mistake would either not be a
195. See, e.g., In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[Flailure to appreciate the
full scope of the invention is one of the most common sources of defects in patents.").
196. Cf Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
198. See KINNEY & LANGE, P.A., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR BUSINEss LAWYERS
§ 3.8, at 63 (2008) ("Patent attorneys generally do not like to have applications allowed when they
are first submitted.").
199. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("[Tlhere can be no other reason the patentee could not have described the
substitute in question." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. Meurer & Nard, supra note 147, at 1987-91 (advocating greater claim refinement as a
solution to mistakes in drafting).
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mistake at all, but rather an attempt to capture an unforeseen product, or a
mistake would be a negligent failure to capture a foreseen product.
As simple as the analysis is, it demands an understanding of reasonable
behavior that is somewhat unrealistic. The nature of the problem comes
from so-called "compliance costs., 20 ' For example, a reasonable person
should use turn signals when driving; and it is easy to foresee that failure to
do so might result in an accident. But it is hard to ensure that one uses turn
signals every time when turning and changing lanes-virtually nobody does
so.20 Similarly, it is easy to say that a reasonable person should be able to
type an individual word without a typographical mistake, especially when
typing an important contract; but it is almost impossible to ensure that a
1000-page contract is completely free from typographical error. The cumu-
lative difficulty of perfect compliance (when each individual instance seems
easy) leads to the almost oxymoronic phenomenon of reasonably negligent
behavior.
Patent drafting mistakes are sometimes unavoidable due to compliance
costs. It is difficult to ensure that a good claim leaves nothing foreseen out
203
of its scope, just as it is difficult to ensure that a good contract has no ty-
pos. At the same time, deterring negligent behavior necessarily requires
disregarding compliance costs, because it is impossible to tell ordinary neg-
ligence apart from inevitable compliance error.2 ° If saying that the accident
occurred during that rare and unavoidable instance when you failed to use
the turn signal were a defense to negligent driving, then every driver who
failed to use the turn signal would argue it.
Ignoring compliance costs does have the effect of holding parties strictly
liable for some unavoidable mistakes, as tort scholars have long recog-
nized.0 5 But this is not a bad rule for patent drafting. First, there is no
middle ground: either patentees can have amendments or they cannot. It is
impossible to have a compromise position where patentees can amend if
they show that the error was a result of unavoidable compliance-cost-
induced mistakes-because nobody can tell whether the mistake was com-
pliance cost induced.
Second, in the absence of a compelling justification, the law shifts loss
only through a showing of negligence, and otherwise leaves the loss where it
lies. 2° The loss of monopoly profits initially falls upon the patentee, who
must seek both PTO intervention (filing a continuation or reissuance) and
201. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
72 (1987).
202. See Mark F. Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions,
and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293, 306 (1988).
203. See Lichtman, supra note 29, at 2017 ("[l~t is hard to fault Tessera's attorneys, who
surely had their hands full perfecting the rest of that unwieldy 104-word descriptive articulation.").
204. Grady, supra note 202, at 306.
205. Id. at 307 ("When courts exclude compliance costs, they effectively create a pocket of
strict liability at the heart of the negligence rule.").
206. See Henderson, supra note 178, at 390-94.
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judicial intervention (adjudicating an infringement suit). The administrative
cost counsels against such intervention. And patentees do not have a com-
pelling justification to shift the loss from their mistakes to their competitors,
even if the mistakes were unavoidable. The fact that a patentee unavoid-
ably-and thus blamelessly-messed up his claim is hardly a reason that
other blameless people (competitors and consumers) must now pay him for
his unavoidable mistake.
Third, the major defect of a strict liability regime is that it induces per-
verse incentives and moral hazards. 27 If drivers are held strictly liable for all
accidents, then pedestrians have less incentive to look both ways before
crossing the street; while holding pedestrians strictly liable induces drivers
to drive recklessly. This is a problem when each party has some ability to
avoid the loss. But, as discussed above, such ability by accused infringers is
very rare in patent law.2°' Not only is the analysis of potential patentee cov-
erage very difficult for an accused infringer to conduct, but the accused
infringer also has no idea why the patentee failed to claim something in the
specification, with unavoidable mistake hardly being the only explanation.
In the one area where the accused infringer does have an advantage-
comparing the unamended claim to his particular product-he has an undi-
minished incentive to take all reasonable care. The moral hazard of reduced
care by accused infringers is practically nonexistent even if strict liability
for claim drafting is placed on patentees.
Finally, the problem of disregarding compliance cost is mitigated
significantly by a causation requirement.2 9 Although it is inevitable that all
of us will occasionally drive negligently, it rarely matters because we are
lucky and our negligence causes no accidents. For patentees, not every
claim-drafting mistake will cause a competitor to intrude upon the expected
monopoly. The notice function of claims is a legitimate limit on claim
amendments only when there is reliance, as the next section discusses.
3. Harmless Mistakes
The analysis up to now has emphasized the comparative advantage of
patentees versus their competitors in avoiding losses from claim-drafting
mistakes. Not all claim-drafting mistakes cause losses. First, if no competi-
tors produce an infringing product even under the originally intended claim,
no loss arises. Suppose the patentee mistakenly writes "cone" instead of
"octagon" and therefore fails to claim octagonal coal cars, the mistake is
harmless if no one produces octagonal coal cars. But even if a competitor
did produce an octagonal coal car, the mistake is still harmless if the
competitor would have chosen to produce octagonal coal cars no matter
207. See generally John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973) (concluding, after applying and analyzing economic models of a number of liabil-
ity regimes, that strict liability is inefficient because it provides perverse incentives).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 190-194.
209. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 201, at 230-33.
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what--even at the risk of infringement damages, because in such a case it
does not matter what the patentee writes in his claim. A claim-drafting mis-
take is only harmful if the competitor relies on the claim language. °
Furthermore, it is important not to overdeter claim-drafting mistakes by
punishing harmless mistakes."' It is an inefficient use of social resources for
patentees to spend money avoiding harmless mistakes.! This applies re-
gardless of whether the regime is governed by negligence or strict liability,
' 3
since without harm there is nothing to allocate.
Patents are public instruments, and reliance on issued claims is normallyS214
presumed. But such reliance can only extend to issued patents, and indeed
before issuance many patent applications are kept secret (giving competitors
nothing upon which to rely). Therefore, the possibility of competitor reli-
ance does not serve as a rationale to limit claim amendments before
issuance, because preissuance drafting mistakes cause no reliance harm. In
other words, the notice function of claims is not undermined by preissuance
amendment. In contrast, the definitional function and the possibility of mis-
appropriating third-party insights applies any time after filing, and is not
triggered by issuance.2 6 The difference between the notice and definitional
functions, separated by the issuance threshold, leads to different policy im-
plications in Part III. Postissuance amendments should never be allowed,
while preissuance amendment should be permitted in some circumstances.
III. SOME POLICY PROPOSALS
If written claims are to be meaningful, they cannot be changed at-will.
But not all changes to claims are equally harmful. As described in the previ-
ous section, claims serve two functions. The first function is to force the
patentee to define what he invented at the time of filing and prevent later
210. Jonathan A. Platt, Note, Protecting Reliance on the Patent System: The Economics and
Equities of Intervening Rights, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031, 1055 (1997) (arguing for a reliance
requirement on intervening fights).
211. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 49 (1990) (arguing that overdeterrence leads to inefficient overinvest-
ment in safety).
212. Internalizing the expected harm ex ante is achieved by compensating the actual harm ex
post. See POSNER, supra note 34, § 6.7, at 187-88 (noting that tort law fully compensates the actual
harm to the "eggshell skull" victim to offset the lack of harm in the "rock skull" case).
213. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 627 (1996) (describing proximate causation for
strict products liability).
214. See Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 575, 582 (1852) ("Patents are public records.
All persons are bound to take notice of their contents .... "). This presumption makes sense even
when few people actually rely on patents in reality. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information,
Uncertainty and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 318-20 (1984). For one thing,
under current law issued claims do not really bind patentees, while reading them increases the liabil-
ity of potential infringers. Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (2003). If claims actually provided meaningful
notice, reliance may well increase.
215. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
216. See supra Section ll.B.
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incorporation of new insights that did not contribute to the patentee's origi-
nal incentive. This definitional function applies any time after the patent is
filed, since the patentee should be made to state his invention at the earliest
opportunity after filing, much as a witness's testimony should be taken as
soon as possible after the relevant event. By contrast, the notice function of
claims and the allocation of loss from claim-drafting mistakes become rele-
vant only after the claims are issued, when the public can rely on such
notice. Because the definitional and notice rationales apply at different time
periods, the policy implications are somewhat different. Specifically, I pro-
pose that amendments should be permitted in limited form before issuance,
but should never be permitted after issuance.
A. Preissuance Amendment Without Retroactive
Priority Against Third-Party Insights
The first problem of allowing claim amendments is that patentees have a
strong incentive to misappropriate later-arising insights through amendment,
thereby expanding their monopoly. The reason this is problematic-aside
from simple unfairness toward whichever party the insight is appropriated
from-is that an expanded monopoly of this type creates social cost with
very little incentive benefit in return. Because the later-arising insight was
unforeseeable at the time of filing, the patentee derives little ex ante incen-
tive from capturing it. However, the social cost remains the same.
Patentees should therefore not be permitted to capture later-arising
insights that were unforeseen at the time of filing. The problem of undue
windfalls by later amendment, however, need not result in the elimination of
all claim amendments. Not all claim amendments, after all, are directed
toward newly arising insights; some are simply attempting to fix mistakes.
Although we would expect patentees to claim everything they foresee in an
original claim, some claim-drafting mistakes are inevitable due to
compliance costs. In the absence of competitor reliance (which occurs only
postissuance), the possibility of abusing amendment to capture undue
windfalls does not itself justify eliminating all claim amendments if there is
a narrower solution.
The narrower solution is to deny claim amendments retroactive priority.
Retroactive priority is very different conceptually from the retroactive effect
of amended claims on a competitor's factory. A claim has retroactive effect
when it makes a previously noninfringing activity infringing ex post-the
factory that was built as a noninfringing factory must now be shut down.
Retroactive priority of a claim, however, simply means that amended claims
are treated as if filed on the date of the initial application and the patentee
receives an unjustified windfall-it does not require any determination of
infringement.27 Take the following example:
217. Another way of understanding the distinction is that the harm of claims having retroac-
tive effect is concentrated on the specific competitor who owns the factory that must be shut down.
The harm of retroactive priority is more diffuse. The patentee gains an unjustified windfall in
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January 1, 2000 Patentee files application.
January 1, 2001 Competitor comes up with insight.
January 1, 2002 Patentee files amendment claiming insight.
Under the current system, where the amended claim is treated for almost
all purposes as filed on January 1, 2000, the patentee can gain an unjustified
windfall from the value of new developments in the intervening period be-
tween 2000 and 2002. All that is necessary to prevent the system of
amendment from being abused to capture this unforeseen value is to deny
the amendment this retroactive priority and consider it as claiming an inven-
tion on January 1, 2002. The amended claim then becomes unpatentable,
because the competitor's insight becomes prior art once the amended claim
is given the later priority date.
The denial of retroactive priority effectively precludes appropriation of
later developments through amendment.2'9 This preserves claim amendments
during the patent prosecution process for legitimate uses-to fix claim-
drafting mistakes during a period when such mistakes are largely harmless.
The harmless mistake rationale, however, does not hold after the patent is-
sues. Once the patent issues, there is no compelling justification for
amending its boundaries.
B. End Postissuance Claim Amendments
The two problems of claim amendments-windfalls to patentees
through capturing later information and frustrating public reliance on claim
language-become more problematic over time. At the time of patent filing,
there are usually no later insights to capture. Before the patent issues, com-
petitors and the public have little upon which to rely.220 Thus, while some
limit on preissuance claim amendments is necessary to prevent the patentee
from capturing unanticipated windfalls, the protection of competitors and
public notice is not a compelling rationale until after the issue of the patent.
The flip side of the coin is that, once a patent issues and becomes poten-
tially subject to competitor reliance, the increased risks of later insights
being retroactively captured and competitor harm strongly counsel against
permitting further claim amendments. There are now more insights to cap-
ture because of the passage of time, and because competitors have an
capturing later insights. This harms not only the competitor whose insight was misappropriated, but
also everybody else, since the cost of a broadened patent is social. The social harm of a broadened
monopoly is why prior user rights (which alleviate the harm to a specific competitor) are not an
adequate solution for amendments that capture unforeseen developments. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 260-262.
218. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) ("That which infringes, if later,
would anticipate, if earlier.").
219. The priority is only important against third-party activity. The patentee's own activities
should not create a statutory bar against amendment.




incentive to improve upon patent disclosures. These improvers (or pirates,
depending on perspective) are also more likely to find unexpected prior art
than patent examiners who rely on applicants to disclose prior art in ex parte
222examination proceedings. The very fact of issuance and attendant public-
ity leads to the creation of more insights. Thus, while the problem of
capturing new insights is not unique to postissuance conditions, it becomes
a greater concern in the postissuance era.
Patent issuance also gives competitors and the public a legitimate reason
to expect that the claims fully define the invention. The issued claims are
supposed to "inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of
the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safe-
ly used or manufactured without a license and which may not., 23 Claims
that may be changed later simply do not inform anybody of what can be
"safely used or manufactured without a license," and certainly do not do so
through "the life of the patent."
As compared to the great harms of permitting postissuance claim
amendment, the risk of penalizing harmless claim mistakes is diminished by
the time of issuance. An original patent application takes, on average, about
two years to issue. 4 If the patentee cannot discover and correct an innocent
mistake within that time, the chance is minimal that he will: (1) discover the
mistake after issuance; (2) before the mistake causes harm to competitors,
and (3) not have that discovery spurred by competitor insights. A bright-line
rule forbidding postissuance claim amendments thus fixes a stable patent
boundary, promotes notice, secures competitor reliance, discourages the
retroactive claiming of unforeseen insights, and is unlikely to impose dis-
225
proportionate costs on the incentive to invent.
Postissuance claim amendments are currently permitted during reissu-
ance and reexamination proceedings, and through continuations. None of
these devices need be completely abolished. Because patentees can file mul-
tiple original claims, a single overbroad claim can be canceled using
reissuance or reexamination, with the narrower claims being rewritten for
221. State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The incentive to
improve was traditionally protected by the experimental use defense. See Chesterfield v. United
States, 159 F. Supp. 371, 376 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (No. 12,391). The experimental use defense is now effectively dead. Madey v. Duke Univ.,
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
222. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008) (applicants' duty to disclose prior art to the PTO); Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1528 (2001) ("Examiners
do not in fact spend long hours poring over a patent application or the prior art. They spend very
little time, and far less than either the lawyers or the triers of fact in infringement cases.").
223. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
224. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 71-73. Average pendency for all patents (including
continuations) is about thirty-two months. PTO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 16.
225. If the rule is considered overly harsh, we can achieve almost as good a result by demand-
ing a very high standard of proof for postissuance amendments. One example is the standard for
postissuance judicial correction, which requires that the mistake be shown to be (1) harmless, (2)
not subject to reasonable debate, and (3) apparent from the face of the patent. See Hoffer v. Micro-
soft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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stylistic purposes (without substantive amendment), a common practice
known as "rewriting into independent form. 226 Continuation applications
also have legitimate uses that do not involve misappropriating later insights
or undoing competitor reliance; namely that continuations are useful to con-
tinue prosecution of original claims when there is reasonable disagreement
about their patentability between applicant and examiner, which need not
227always involve an appeal. Thus, I am not proposing to end any of thesedevices, only to end their use in facilitating postissuance claim amendments.
IV. CONSIDERING OBJECTIONS
A. The Sky Has Not Fallen
One simple objection to my analysis might be that, even if freely amend-
ing claims might create problems in theory, it is a longstanding feature of
the U.S. patent system that has not caused significant problems in prac-
tice. "' Although anecdotal accounts of claim amendment abuse are229
common, the plural of anecdote is not data. Moreover, while the worst
possible abuses are made possible by postissuance amendment, empirically
continuations account for only 23 percent of issued patents,2 ° and reissu-
ance and reexamination are even rarer. If laying traps for unwary
competitors is so profitable, why don't patentees do it all the time?
This rosy view of the current system needs some qualification. First,
there is good evidence that uncertain boundaries do cause problems for the
patent system, given that the patent system appears to induce more litigation/. 231
costs than research and development expenditure. Frequent litigation is a
good proxy for failing boundaries and inadequate notice because the pur-
pose of clear boundaries is to allow private ordering without litigation.232
Second, continuations and other amendment devices contribute dispropor-
tionately to litigation and thus the notice failure of the patent system.
226. See generally Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1141-
43 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
227. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 96-97. Of course, there is a point at which reason-
able disagreement becomes an unreasonable effort to wear down the examiner's patience by
repetitive filing. Id. at 74-76. There is no good reason for filing a large number of repetitive con-
tinuations. See Lichtman, supra note 29, at 2018 (describing one such effort by GemStar-TV Guide
International).
228. See Schreiner & Doody, supra note 10, at 559--60.
229. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (using amendment
to capture later-developed industry standard); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Re-
search Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing a chain of seventeen
continuations).
230. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 69.
231. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 6, at 130-44.
232. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 928 (2001) ("Unpredictability or uncertainty in the boundaries of
the patent holder's property right ... will divert resources from innovative efforts (research and
development) to enforcement (transaction or litigation costs)...."); Rich, supra note 20, at 501.
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Although continuations account for only 23 percent of issued patents, they
account for 52 percent of litigated patents. 23 Therefore, remedying the un-
certainty problem is worthwhile and claim amendments that makes patent
boundaries constantly movable is a significant factor in this uncertainty.
As for the fact that not every patentee files multiple claim amendments,
a likely explanation is the cost of continuations (which are by far the most
important procedural device for amendment). Although one could theoreti-
cally keep a chain of continuations running for all twenty years of the patent
lifespan and thereby achieve continuous amendment, doing so is expensive
because each continuation requires a fee and an attorney to prosecute it,2
M
and each continuation only lasts for a few years before a new one must be
231filed . In this way, the expense of continuing patent prosecution acts as a
"costly screen.' 23 6 Another way of implementing a bar to postissuance claim
amendments, or of reducing the number of preissuance amendments, would
be to charge a prohibitive fee for the privilege.
Despite already substantial PTO fees, however, it appears that applicants
are filing more claim amendments than ever.237 Nor can PTO fees be raised
much further, since they are either statutorily mandated or can only be
raised to recover the costs of the PTO,23 not for broad social policy purposes
such as protecting the notice and definition functions of written claims.239
Thus, while PTO fees have been a useful procedural limit on abuse of claim
amendment-a way of limiting the damage-more direct substantive limits
should be considered.
233. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 70; see also John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents,
92 GEO. L.J. 435, 457 (2004) ("[Ejach litigated patent resulted from an average of 2.57 different
applications... ).
234. The exact math depends on how the continuation "chain" is implemented. Filing a for-
mal continuation application (necessary for the original patent to issue) incurs a fee of $1090 (the
sum of the filing, search, and examination fees). 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2008). Filing a request for con-
tinued examination incurs a fee of $810. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (2008). These are per application
amounts and quickly add up.
235. Lichtman, supra note 29, at 2018.
236. See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Valuation Asymmetries (Univ. of Chi., Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 205, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 105184 (arguing that
PTO costs have the more general effect of screening out low value patents).
237. Allison et al., supra note 233, at 458 ("[A]pplicants are increasingly securing their ability
to file additional claims through an extensive continuation practice."); Lemley & Moore, supra note
31, at 69 ("[T]he trend has been a steady increase.").
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(d) (2006).
239. Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled
Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051 (2009) (describing the political difficulties
of raising PTO fees and the current incentive to grant more patents to generate more fees).
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B. Maintaining Patentee Incentives
A major concern with limiting the ability of patentees to amend claimsS . 240
is that it will reduce incentives to invent and disclose inventions. The pat-
ent system involves a trade-off between these incentives and the cost of
monopoly.f4 Reducing patentee options ex post will inevitably work to re-
duce ex ante incentives to some extent.
Of course, if no reduction in patentee incentives were to be permitted,
then we would have patents of unlimited scope and infinite duration, which
would harm innovation as inventors are almost always both patentees and
users of inventions patented by others. The point of the patent system is to
balance incentives and cost.242 My point in this Article is to propose im-
provements that, overall, will save society more in monopoly cost than the
reduction in patentee incentives. The fact that patentee incentives may be
reduced to some extent is not a persuasive barrier if those reduced incentives
are offset by other social benefits.
Limiting the ability of patentees to engage in misappropriation of later
insights by amendment serves this purpose because of the unequal discount-
ing differential, as described in Section I1.B. The inability to capture
unforeseen developments does little to reduce prefiling incentives-the logi-
cal corollary of the fact that unforeseen windfalls do little to increase
prefiling incentives. Once the significant monopoly cost incurred in confer-
ring the windfall is considered, the balance points to limiting the use of
amendments to capture unforeseen developments.
Similarly, although patentees may feel reduced incentives from being
forced to bear the loss of their mistakes, this is offset by the gains in incen-
tives from competitors in being able to rely on written claims and increase
competition in legitimate products. To take the driving analogy once more,
if I can drive recklessly and make the pedestrians I hit pay for the damage, I
will have tremendous incentives to drive more often, with the benefit that I
will get to places I need to go faster. However, this incentive is not worth the
cost, the cost being that pedestrians will stop walking when I am in the area.
Likewise, the fact that patentees can intentionally draft misleading claimsS243
and redefine their inventions later traps competitors into infringement.
Since competitors thus trapped cannot rely on claims to avoid future in-
fringement and have no other cost-effective means of ascertaining patent
boundaries (exhaustively analyzing every patent specification and the entire
240. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 772-81
(2009) (analyzing the costs and benefits of claiming practice from a rules-versus-standards perspec-
tive).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 136-139.
242. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
243. The most infamous example may be Rambus Inc., which participated in a standards-
setting organization, denied it had patents covering the proposed standard, and then changed its
claims to cover the issued standard after it had been adopted by an entire industry. See Rambus Inc.
v. FrC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (ruling in favor of Rambus); Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs.
AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same).
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prior art being cost-prohibitive), they must treat occasional patent infringe-
ment as an unavoidable cost of doing business, raising prices and reducing
quantity on all goods (whether or not eventually found to be infringing).
24
Consumers are thus made worse off as a result.
C. The Efficiencies of Delayed Adjudication
Another argument for allowing postissuance amendment is that it saves
the bulk of administrative and judicial resources for the patents that really
matter: those that are involved in litigation or at least licensed. 245 Under this
theory, ex ante claim drafting and examination is largely an inefficient use
of social resources, because only 5% of patents will eventually be litigated•. 246
or licensed. The ex ante resources spent on prosecuting and examining the
remaining 95%of patents turn out to be wasteful, since those patents do not
matter.
As applied to PTO examination, I have no disagreement with this argu-
ment.247 If a patent covers an invention that nobody wants and nobody
infringes (e.g. a Rube Goldberg machine), then we never have to consider its
validity, because nobody cares. In such cases, the resources spent on ex ante
examination truly are wasted.
But the lack of litigation and licensing does not indicate that the
resources spent on ex ante claim drafting are wasted. First, how do we figure
out if a patent covers only a worthless invention, so as to not bother to
litigate or license it? By looking at the claims. Second, the worthlessness of
an invention is not the only reason not to license or litigate its patent. Rather,
a patentee who is practicing a very valuable patent can also avoid litigation,
if the scope and validity of that patent is clear. Thus, clarifying scope early
permits a fast and certain determination by all potential players without•.• • 248
requiring litigation, which is the whole point of having claims. The fact
that 95% of patents are quickly determined to be worthless and never
241
litigated is a success, not a failure. Indeed, if the rate of patent litigation
even approaches 5%, this would show systemic failure in comparison to
250
other property systems. Imagine the chaos that would result if even 1% of
all real property deeds were so ambiguous that parties had to go to court to
244. See Lemley, supra note 110, at 21-22.
245. Hubbard, supra note 30, at 359-62.
246. Lemley, supra note 222, at 1507.
247. Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
39, 77-78 (2008).
248. Rich, supra note 20, at 501.
249. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (noting that litigation is caused by uncertainty in outcome).
250. The actual rate of litigated patents is very hard to determine. Jean Lanjouw and Mark
Schankerman found an overall rate of nineteen case filings for every 1000 patents, which would
translate to a rate of about 1.9 percent; but each case may involve more than one patent, and a patent
may be litigated in more than one case. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 55 (2004).
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resolve their boundaries: given the hundreds of millions of homes and other
properties across the United States, the court system would quickly become
overwhelmed.
To be sure, it is possible to imagine a world where ex ante claim drafting
is extremely costly, and ex post determination without claims is extremely
cheap ,2 such that the efficient mechanism is ex post delineation of scope.
Some patents are clearly worthless even without looking at the claims-e.g.,
fanciful inventions such as perpetual-motion machines. If the number of
facially worthless patents is sufficiently high (thus the cost of ex post deter-
mination sufficiently low), and the cost of claim drafting is also high, then
ex ante claim drafting becomes inefficient. Such a hypothetical world, how-
252ever, is not one that we live in, if history is any guide. And if such a world
ever came into being, the efficient solution would be to abolish ex ante
claim drafting and permit omnibus claims-not to require detailed claims
that are costly to draft and also permit them to be changed later.
D. Less Drastic Alternatives
1. Prior User Rights
In a report addressing the problems of the patent system, the Federal
Trade Commission identified the phenomenon of misappropriation by
amendment as a problem and proposed "prior user rights" as a solution. 1 3 A
prior user right is a personal right to continue a prior course of business,
even though an intervening patent now makes the course of business infring-
ing.25 For example, if I build a factory to make tables, and a patent on tables
then issues to a competitor, I would normally be required to stop using the
factory. A prior user right would permit me to keep using the factory to
make more tables, despite the newly issued patent.
The timing mechanics of prior user rights function similarly to my pro-
posal of denying priority to claim amendments. In each case, the time
sequence is identical: the patentee files the application, then a competitor
develops a new product, after which the original patentee amends his claim
to capture the competitor's later-developed insight. The difference between a
prior user right and my proposal is that a prior user right gives the third
251. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 211 (suggesting that the lax utility requirement
allows the screening out of clearly inoperable inventions at low cost, and leaves the market to win-
now out the rest).
252. See Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) (describing de-
termining infringement without claims as "inference and conjecture"); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S.
568, 573 (1877) (citing the "growth of the patent system" as requiring greater clarity in language to
keep the system functioning).
253. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETI-
TION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 16 (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
254. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006) (describing prior user rights for business method pat-
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party a personal right to use the product with the patentee, creating a du-
opoly.2" My proposal invalidates the amended claim outright, creating
256competition. Which of these effects is better?
One quick response might be that we always prefer competition to du-
opoly to monopoly, but this is an overstatement. The monopoly profits of a
patent are inseparable from the incentive to invent. 5 In some circumstances,
if we were attempting to incentivize the patentee while protecting the incen-
tives of one particular third-party competitor, creating a duopoly between
them that splits the profits between these parties may be a good compro-
mise.2' s Indeed, where patent incentives are necessary for both a pioneer and
subsequent improver, patent law creates such a duopoly by granting over-
lapping patents.5 9
In the context of capturing unforeseen later developments, however, we
are neither attempting to incentivize the patentee nor are we protecting the
interest of any single competitor. The cost of broadening a patentee's mo-
nopoly is social--everyone pays higher prices for the monopoly-and this
social cost is not usually borne by any single competitor. Moreover, the
incentive to the patentee is simply not present, because the windfall gain
261was unforeseen at the time of filing. Paying monopoly profits to a patentee
for no incentive gain is a bad deal. Paying duopoly profits for no incentive
gain is marginally better, since duopoly profits are lower,162 but it is still a
bad deal.
While the unfairness intuition points to protecting the particular com-
petitor whose insight is captured by the patentee (in which case a personal
right to that competitor might suffice), the economic rationale of balancing
monopoly cost with incentive benefit suggests that prior user rights are in-
sufficient to protect society. Allowing prior user rights still permits patentees
255. Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 92, 92.
256. I am assuming that the competitor cannot obtain his own patent on the new insight (a
"blocking patent"). If the competitor's insight is so significant that he can obtain a blocking patent,
then the difference is not between competition and duopoly but how the single monopoly profit will
be split. Even in this context, the misallocation is harmful because a patentee who reaps windfall
profits inefficiently reduces the share to later improvers, reducing the reward in the race for im-
provement patents. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 9, at 892-93.
257. Rich, supra note 138, at 479.
258. See Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REv. 475, 498 (2006) (arguing that an independent-invention defense that creates a du-
opoly between patentee and later independent inventor provides efficient incentives for both).
259. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
"lEx. L. REV. 989. 1000-11 (1997) (describing the differential treatment for minor improvements
that receive no patent, and significant improvements that receive their own blocking patent); Robert
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62
TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) (same).
260. The social cost may be privatized if there is only one competitor, either due to market
dynamics or because the competitor holds a blocking patent.
261. See supra Section ll.B.
262. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
161-70 (4th ed. 2005) (describing Cournot duopoly); Vermont, supra note 258, at 498 (same).
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to retain a significant windfall. To prevent undue windfalls, patentees should
not be permitted to capture unforeseen insights at all.
2. Intervening Rights
Separate from the problem of undue windfalls, there is the problem of
competitor reliance on issued claims. The traditional method of protecting
competitor reliance has been intervening rights,263 which exempt competitors
from damages prior to the completion of a reissuance or reexamination pro-
ceeding, if claims are amended during those proceedings.2 64A court may• e •265
also permit (in its discretion) a personal right to continue infringement. A
competitor that builds a factory to make three-legged tables may be permit-
ted to continue using the factory, even if a reissued claim now makes the
three-legged tables infringing. In this way, intervening rights function quite
similarly to prior user rights.
A robust application of intervening rights-and extending them to cover
all postissuance amendments, including those made through continuations-
can mitigate many of the notice harms I have described.266 At the same time,
intervening rights are a second-best substitute for ending postissuance claim
amendment altogether.
First, intervening rights cannot address the definition problem-
patentees using amendment to capture later insights as windfalls-since
intervening rights also create a duopoly. The problem of unanticipated wind-
falls becomes more significant during the postissuance era because the
simple passage of time increases the risk of unanticipated windfalls occur-
ring and because issuance creates an incentive to design around and make
improvements.16 Indeed, the most common situation where intervening
rights arise today-reexamination to overcome newly discovered prior art-
is a situation where patentees amend claims in response to unforeseen de-
268velopments (in this case, previously unknown prior art).
Second, courts have not been particularly robust in applying intervening
rights to protect competitors. While courts do have discretion to permit con-
tinuing use, this discretion is exercised sparingly and usually with stringent
limits.
69
263. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
264. See Section R.B.
265. See BIC Leisure Prods., Inc., v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (describing intervening rights).
266. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 109-11 (advocating intervening rights as a solution
to the problems created by continuations).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 221-222.
268. See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2006) (requiring a "substantial new question of patentability" to
commence reexamination).
269. See, e.g., Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (permitting infringer to dispose of existing inventory, but nothing more); Plastic Con-
tainer Corp. v. Cont'l Plastics, Inc., 607 E2d 885, 902-03 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that there is no
right to continue infringement when infringer had already made substantial profits); Halliburton Co.
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270Third, under Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., willful infringement of a reissued
patent creates unclean hands against continuing use.17' However, since the
failure to immediately cease clear infringement is considered willful, 2 2 this
creates an almost perfect Catch-22: a defendant seeking equitable interven-
ing rights is seeking to continue infringement, but continuing infringement
creates unclean hands and bars equitable intervening rights (the "equitable"
aspect is what allows continuing infringement).273 To be sure, an infringer
could cease his activity upon being notified of the reissued patent, file a de-
claratory judgment lawsuit, and then ask for permission to restart
infringement after the case has been adjudicated. But this is hardly a practi-
cal option, since the sunk cost of investment and the hardship of changing
course is precisely the problem that equitable intervening rights is designed
to address. The competitor who can afford to cease infringement for the
pendency of a multiyear patent lawsuit is not the one that most needs equi-
table intervening rights.
3. Limiting the Number of Continuations
The problem of unlimited claim amendments has also been noticed by
the PTO. The PTO attempted to address this problem in 2007 by enacting
regulations that would have limited the number of continuations to three,
274with additional continuations requiring good cause. These regulations
were enjoined by a district court. 27 After a change of administration, the
PTO then rescinded the regulation.
Given the problems caused by unlimited claim amendment, limiting the
number of continuations (the worst method of claim amendment) to three
would have been a good start. At the same time, three continuations still
provide a total of seven rounds of claim amendment, six of those potentially
after the issuance of a first patent.176 Therefore, even under the PTO's
v. Western Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1973, 1983 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that there is no right to continue infringement when investment made prior to original patent
issuance).
270. 248 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
271. Shockley, 248 F.3d at 1361.
272. Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
273. The Federal Circuit recently made it harder to prove willful infringement by requiring
that the infringement be very clear by the time of the ultimate judgment. In re Seagate Tech., LLC,
497 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). Because many patents have vague language that
allow plausible noninfringement arguments, Seagate makes willful infringement hard to prove in
most cases. One likely exception is a reissued patent designed to capture a new competitor product,
where the claim language has been retroactively polished so that infringement will be very clear.
274. Patent and Trademark Office, Changes To Practice for Continued Examination Filings,
72 Fed. Reg. 46716, 46837-41 (Aug. 21, 2007). The precise formulation was two formal continua-
tion applications and one request for continued examination. Id.
275. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008), appeal pending, No. 2008-1352
(Fed. Cir.).
276. Each continuation provides two rounds of claim amendment. 37 C.ER. § 1.113
(2008). The original application receives one round of claim amendment as-of-right. 37 C.F.R.
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proposal, claim changing through multiple continuations would have per-
sisted for years after a patent first issued, resulting in meaningless and
uncertain boundaries for that entire duration until the third continuation was
exhausted.
Numerical limits on continuations also have the potential to be overly
restrictive. Not all continuation applications are bad. Some are used to keep
pursuing original claims while avoiding the expense of an appeal, and con-
tinuations can also be used to fix mistakes prior to issuance of any patent.277
Although I am inclined to think that three continuations should be more than
enough for these legitimate purposes (and patentees could have petitioned
for more under the PTO rules if they have good cause), the focus should
remain on the substantive harm of claim amendment rather than the particu-
lar procedural vehicle by which such amendments are pursued.
E. Perverse Incentives and Patentee Adaptations
Finally, it bears consideration whether my proposal might generate per-
verse incentives or be easily circumvented through patentee adaptations.
Two such adaptations come to mind: writing very vague claims that repli-
cate omnibus claims, and filing patent applications later. While both present
some problems, these adaptations are still less problematic than the present
system of unlimited amendment.
1. Vague Claims as Substitutes for Changeable Claims
It is often argued that, if patentees were strictly constrained by the literal
278text of claims, then they would simply draft very vague claims. This ar-
gument has some force. An omnibus claim, after all, is a very vague claim.
But the problem is much more limited than it appears at first glance.
An important conceptual distinction must be made between broad patent
claims and vague patent claims. A broad patent claim is one that covers
many things. A vague patent claim is one that might cover many things, but
also might cover very few things-the vagueness comes from the indeter-
minacy regarding what the claim covers. 279 A claim can be broad without
being vague: "I claim the entire universe" is a broad but very clear claim.'8
On the other hand, a truly vague claim is always potentially quite broad, but
it can be centered on a core that is quite narrow.
§§ 1. 111-112 (2008). Thus an original application plus three continuations result in seven rounds of
amendment.
277. See supra text accompanying note 206.
278. Samson Vermont, Taming the Doctrine of Equivalents in Light of Patent Failure, 16 J.
INTELL. PRop. L. 83, 92 (2008).
279. TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICoT-r, VAGUENESS IN LAW 1 (2000) (defining vagueness as indeter-
minacy).
280. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-13 (1854) (finding it "impossible to
misunderstand the extent" of Morse's claim, and that it was "too broad").
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Assuming that the claims are all valid, a patentee will prefer a clearly
broad claim over a vague claim, and a vague claim over a clearly narrow
claim. But the relevant question is not whether the patentee will prefer a
vague claim to a clearly narrow claim, but rather whether the patentee will
prefer a vague claim with a particular expected average or a certain claim
with that same average. That is, assuming a definite claim that will cover
five types of widgets, does the patentee prefer a more vague claim, which
might ultimately cover ten types of widgets, or nothing at all, depending on
how a court construes it?
If the construction by a court later is unbiased, and the patentee is risk
averse, then he will prefer the more certain claim, since the vague claim is
by definition more risky."' And the requirement of unbiased claim construc-
tion is where the problem lies. For an omnibus claim, the claim construction
is biased because it grants the patentee the broadest scope the law allows,
incorporating all later information (such as newly discovered prior art). The
retroactivity of omnibus claim construction-by ex post giving the patentee
the benefit of all subsequent insights and discoveries of prior art-is why
patentees prefer omnibus claims. The same is true to some extent of other
claims. Courts allow hindsight bias to creep into claim construction so that
vague claims are construed to avoid invalidity,2s2 to give "pioneering" pat-
ents greater scope,283 and to allow greater scope for infringement than
invalidity. These claim construction doctrines give the patentee the benefit
of later information, which creates a patentee preference for vagueness. This
is akin to coin-tossing with a biased coin, leading to a natural preference to
bet because the odds of winning are better than 50 percent.
The fact that claim construction doctrine biases vague language in favor
of the patentee, however, is an argument for reforming claim construction
doctrine,8 5 not for maintaining changeable claims as an alternative. More-
over, the hindsight bias is one that courts have addressed to some extent,
with a recent emphasis on giving claims their original meaning at the time
those claims were written. If claims were consistently construed to remove
the hindsight advantage, then patentees would have no incentive to create
greater uncertainty for their own rights with very vague claims. Indeed, his-
tory shows that patentees, like all other people, prefer certainty over
vagueness: it was patentees who developed written claims to create greater
281. For the definition of risk, see supra note 140.
282. Klein v. Russell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 433, 466 (1874); Turrill v. Mich. S. R.R. Co., 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 491, 510 (1864) (construing claim narrowly to avoid newly presented prior art).
283. Brothers v. United States, 250 U.S. 88, 89 (1919).
284. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 E3d 1357, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (requiring higher standard to prove invalidity). But see Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129
U.S. 530, 537 (1889) ("That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
285. Lemley, supra note 1, at 105 (arguing for fixed meaning).
286. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see Nazomi
Commc'n, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (cautioning
against putting "the validity cart before the claim construction horse").
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certainty in their rights, over the extremely vague "substantial similarity"
standard.2 7
2. Delayed Initial Filing as an Alternative to Amendment
One other alternative that patentees may engage in is to delay the filing
of their original patent applications. Since the original claims are not fixed
until the patent application is filed, delaying the filing of the application
allows the original claims to themselves be updated in light of new devel-
opments.
The reason this works is because the original application (and the origi-
nal claims) can receive retroactive priority to an even earlier time: the time
of "invention" under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).2 8 The mechanics of this delay tac-
tic become exactly the same as retroactive priority for amendment.2 19 This is
a consequence of the unique "first to invent" system of priority in the United
States, where (given adequate proof) the priority of an application can be
retroactive to the date that the patentee conceived the invention in his mind,
rather than when he files the application in the PTO.
Given the exact same mechanics at play, one simple solution is to abol-
ish retroactive priority for original claims and simply accord them the
priority date of their filing. Indeed, pending legislation is well on track to
move the United States to a "first to file" system that will do precisely this.
Although there is much to be said for the solution of removing retroac-
tive priority for original claims, one countervailing consideration is in order:
the early filing of an application has consequences not only for priority, but
also for the patent term, which is keyed to the date of filing (not inven-
290tion). Moreover, this is deliberate, so that a patentee can secure twenty-
one years of effective monopoly through the first-to-invent system. 29' The
sum is that changing priority rules for the original filing (as opposed to
amendments) involves many more moving parts that are liable to cause un-
anticipated consequences, bespeaking caution in the process.
Moreover, although patentees may theoretically be able to delay their fil-
ing and then claim retroactive priority under section 102(g), in practice this
292 293is very hard to do.' 9 And retroactive priority extends, at most, to one year.
Thus, while a few patentees may attempt to delay their original applications
in order to incorporate later developments, the high cost of delaying an
287. Duffy, supra note 93, at 309-10.
288. For a summary of the 102(g) rules, see MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 9, at 440-41.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 217-218.
290. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
291. See MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 9, at 59-60.
292. Edward G. Fiorito, Highlights of Selected Recommendations of the Advisory Commission
on Patent Law Reform, I TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 11, 16 (1992) (noting that far less than 1 percent
of applications enter the 102(g) interference process, and the senior party (first-to-file) usually
wins).




original application means such abuse is likely to be significantly less
worrisome than the present system when such delay is much more pervasive
and long-lasting.
CONCLUSION
Because patentees have broad freedom to file multiple original claims,
resort to claim amendment after filing occurs for only two reasons: (1) to
react to unforeseen developments discovered after filing, or (2) to correct a
mistake in articulating what the patentee foresaw at the time of filing. Both
of these motivations pose significant problems. Permitting a patentee to cap-
ture unforeseen developments confers an inefficient windfall upon him.
Permitting the patentee to correct his own drafting mistakes shifts the loss of
those mistakes onto competitors, reducing the patentee's incentives to take
reasonable care.
To eliminate these perverse incentives, I propose eliminating postissu-
ance amendment. This preserves competitor reliance on issued claims, fixes
a meaningful patent boundary, and gives patentees efficient incentives to
take proper care in drafting claims. Because competitor reliance is much
diminished before issuance, and because harmless mistakes in claim draft-
ing will occur and can be efficiently remedied during prosecution,
preissuance amendments should be permitted. Such preissuance amend-
ments, however, should not be permitted to capture later third-party insights,
and denial of retroactive priority to preissuance amendment permits their
use in curing of mistakes while preventing the possibility of retroactive cap-
ture.
Beyond such a technical analysis, the problems of unlimited claim
amendment are really quite intuitive. A claim subject to unlimited post hoc
amendment is useless as a boundary, since it neither defines the patentee's
real ability to exclude nor provides meaningful notice to competitors. A
fence that could be moved tomorrow is not a fence that anyone should rely
on to determine where to build a house. The very purposes of having a writ-
ten claim--definition and notice-require that the written claim be
meaningful and binding. A binding claim, of course, cannot be one that is
changeable at will.
294. See George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate-First-to-Invent vs. First-to-File,
1967 DuKE L.J. 923, 938-39 (discussing advantages of early filing).
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